PROJECTING ABSENCE: A DECADE OF U.S. ARCTIC INTELLIGENCE, POLICY, AND PERCEPTIONS OF RUSSIA

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PROJECTING ABSENCE: A DECADE OF US ARCTIC INTELLIGENCE, POLICY, AND PERCEPTIONS OF RUSSIA

A

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Abstract

The U.S. government engaged in Arctic security and politics at a low level throughout early 2000s, while the Russian government was quite active in it Arctic region during this timeframe. Using text, data and visual analysis tools, this research conducts content analysis, sentiment analysis and mapping on U.S. Arctic intelligence documents released through Wikileaks. It compares patterns found in the content of intelligence documents with content and sentiment patterns found in U.S. Arctic policy to correlate a shared perception of Russian Arctic engagement. Research findings indicate that the dialogue about Russian engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s in both the intelligence community (IC) and policy-making communities attribute a low level of threat to U.S. national security with regard to Arctic issues. These findings may contribute to the lack of U.S. engagement in the Arctic leading up to the Crimean/Ukraine conflict.

Keywords:

political science, Arctic security, intelligence, U.S. Arctic policy, text analysis, discourse analysis, data analysis, content analysis, sentiment analysis, mapping, Wikileaks, geopolitics

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... spin forth the web of significations that christen it, determine it, fix it in the universe of discourse. - Michel Foucault

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Chapter 1 Introduction

During the course of this research project, Russian-U.S. relations in the Arctic have fallen to their lowest point since the Cold War. In 2014, Russian aggression in Crimea and the Ukraine elicited sanctions from the United States that affected Russian Arctic oil extraction partnerships. Later in 2014 Russia began to increase displays of military might in the Arctic via land, water, and air exercises. U.S. response to such behavior has been measured, despite increased tension between the nations, and publicly the United States maintains aspirations for peace and cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. As time passed Russian aggression spread from Eastern Europe to the Arctic and now into the Middle East. This research project looks to the decade preceding current tensions to understand the extent to which the U.S. has securitized (i.e. perceived a threat to national security that puts the nation state, sovereign borders, values, or its citizens in peril) Russian engagement in the Arctic.

This project explores U.S perceptions of threat about Russia's Arctic engagement during the early 2000s. It does this by looking for discursive patterns found in U.S. intelligence documents collected on Russia and the Arctic from 2004 to 2011 and Arctic policy documents from 2009 to 2015. The project's intelligence sources are not military intelligence, but theories explored later in the thesis support the use of non-military intelligence in understanding securitization and threat perceptions. Intelligence is useful for this research because it is a building block of policy, and because intelligence gathering and

analysis plays a key role in detecting threat and risk to state actors.

Many additional variables and sources contribute to U.S. perceptions of Russia and the Russian Arctic. In general, historical discourses and cultural discourses shape perceptions of Russia and the Arctic, including those discourses taking place in news media and entertainment. In fact, news media is used in intelligence gathering as well, and is often referred to as "open source intelligence." This project's data set contains such open source intelligence. I limited and focused the scope of my inquiry on perceptions of Russia and the Russian Arctic to intelligence because it is a "secret" and "protected" discourse. In her 2000 book *Dreamworld and Catastrophe* about how mass "dreamworlds" shape and drive human behavior, Susan Buck-Morss links perceptions of threat and violence with secrets when she argues that the domains of threat, violence, and ultimately warfare are secret spaces and secret powers.[1] According to Buck-Morss, to protect itself from threats the state must have internal secret mandates that allow the state to send secret actors externally to secretly disarm, contain, or de-stabilize the threats. Secrets, secret conversations and protected discourses are paramount to understanding perceptions of threat and the violent (or non-violent) behaviors of the state.

Moreover, the insider roles of intelligence and policymakers give these secrets potency. Carl Schmitt's *The Concept of the Political* examines the roles of political enemies and friends. Schmitt argues that the designation of a friend or

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[1] Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 16, 20-21.

enemy of the state (a designation which is built upon perceived level of threat): "can neither be decided by a previously decided general norm nor by judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral party. Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict."[2]

Secret and private discourses originating from inside the state are the discourses of vested parties in conflict, and ultimately these parties' perceptions will affect possible future government action. In light of the above, this project examines the level of threat detected by U.S. State Department intelligence and private U.S. intelligence sources with regard to Russia's Arctic engagement.

In this work, threat is not treated as an absolute. Instead, threat is understood to have degrees of severity: lack of threat, low level of threat, medium level of threat, high level of threat, urgent threat. This concept of a degree of threat follows U.S. government notions about threat seen in classification language (see page 71 for definitions), or in the Homeland Security threat advisory system, also referred to as the "terror threat level." It is my belief that perceptions of threat prompt state action, but also that threat is crucial to the state's self-concept, or identity. In the process of identifying a threat the state is simultaneously creating and defining itself. This identity is intrinsically tied to the creation of an "other," or to reference the work of Carl Schmitt, the "enemy."

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[2] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 27.

In this project, I assume that if the U.S. actors examined agree about a high degree of threat to U.S. state interests from Russian engagement in the Arctic, it is more likely that the United States will take action in response to this threat. Alternately, if the U.S. actors examined in this project do not agree, or do not consistently identify a serious threat from Russia's development of its Arctic, I expect a low level of U.S. action in response to an ambiguous degree of threat. I examine this topic further in the discussion of my hypothesis below. In short, after two years of my own open-source monitoring on Arctic security and politics, I have not seen a high level of military or diplomatic engagement from the U.S. government in the Arctic. This lack of engagement leads me to hypothesize that U.S. actors did not detect a consistent, high-level threat stemming from Russia's Arctic engagement. While U.S. lack of engagement in the Arctic could be influenced by other factors, this project proposes that threats to state interests prompt state action, and that it is through discourse that threat is determined and communicated.

The type of "action," with which this project primarily concerns itself are those that expand U.S. military and constabulary (policing, search and rescue, oil spill response, coast guard, and other such non-military security functions) capacities. This understanding of action as a response to socially-constructed and perceived threat is rooted in international relations theory of constructivism which posits that state interests and identity are created by social practice as opposed to being innate and un-changing. Constructivist understandings of the

social processes that create and define state interest, threat and security ground my hypothesis and research.

The inquiry seeks to understand U.S. perceptions of threat, which are viewed in this project as a potential driving force for the U.S.'s own Arctic activities. Presumably, the perception of a high-level threat from Russia's Arctic endeavors would prompt increased U.S. Arctic engagement. By the same token, a lack of or low-level of threat detected from Russia's Arctic engagements would explain a lack of U.S. engagement in the Arctic. This research project, while mainly focused on securitization in intelligence and policy sources, ultimately contributes to a larger discussion about the U.S.'s minimal engagement in the Arctic.

Lack of U.S. engagement is characterized by a decreased number of Arctic-trained forces, by repeated ignored requests from multiple agencies for new Arctic-capable icebreakers, and by lagging behind other Arctic nations (as well as some non-Arctic nations) in policy documents and high-level engagement in Arctic governmental forums such as the Arctic Council. "Lack of engagement" does not mean that the U.S. has completely disengaged in Arctic governance, military capacity or infrastructure. The phrase "lack of engagement" is meant to describe the minimal or lower level of engagement the U.S. has taken when compared with its Arctic and Arctic-interested counterparts, and going forward the terms lack of engagement and low-level of engagement will be used interchangeably.

The time period of study is historically significant not only because it precedes the present day strained U.S.-Russian relations. The early 2000s saw the emergence of the Russian Federation as a global power, the strengthening and expansion of the Arctic Council, changing roles of the U.S.[3] and Russia as global producers of oil and gas, and increased attention to climatic changes taking place in the Arctic. Arctic governance was emerging during this time period, and can be considered as approaching formalization. During the study period (2004 – 2011), U.S.-Russian relations were reasonably cordial. In the Arctic, U.S.-Russian relations were marked by efforts at peace and cooperation. That being said, U.S.-Russian diplomatic affairs were never stress-free. Despite cordial relations, Russia's role in the Arctic has historically evoked discomfort in the United States and other Arctic nations. Despite aspirations for cooperation in the Arctic, tension and mistrust are increasing. It is instructive to examine this emerging period in Arctic relations, as it sets the stage for the U.S. governments' own behavior and capacities in the Arctic today, particularly with regard to its perceptions of Russia's aims. This analysis links perceptions of threat, securitization and U.S. engagement.

In 2014 and 2015 the United States began to engage at increasingly high levels in Arctic-region specific concerns, including producing several key policy documents. This engagement comes quite late in comparison to actions taken by other Arctic nations. Russia began investing more heavily in its Arctic

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[3] "U.S Field Production of Crude Oil 1860 – 2014," *U.S. Energy Information Administration,* October 30, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a.

infrastructure, oil and gas development, and expanding its Arctic military and naval capacity in 2009. Despite a history of tense relations between the U.S. and Russia the U.S. did not securitize Russia's activities in the Arctic, at least in 2009. Had the U.S. securitized Russian behavior in the Arctic in 2009, it would have asserted itself in governance or military activities at that time, rather than waiting until 2015 to engage more energetically.

This thesis examines intelligence and policy documents to answer the following research questions: 1) To what extent did intelligence sources securitize Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s? and 2) Does the discourse of U.S. intelligence about Russian engagement in the Arctic align with the discourse of U.S. Arctic policy?

While many factors influence policy, including: geopolitics, budget allocations, intra-governmental dynamics, domestic politics, lobby interests, civil society, and (particularly in the Arctic) scientific research, this project examines congruities or incongruities between intelligence texts and policy texts. Because the dataset is text-based, and because the process of securitization revolves around what theorists call the "speech act," this research project is framed by discourse theory's ideas about the power of language. The theory of discourse analysis informs the project's research. The thesis's discourse analysis is a part of a three-tiered methodological approach that analyzes production and distribution patterns of the intelligence dataset, performs a discourse analysis of

the content of the dataset, and culminates in a comparison of the intelligence data and the policy data.

The thesis closes with a comparison of intelligence sources and policy documents regarding the security threat that Russian Arctic engagement poses to the U.S. This comparison aims to reveal any possible disconnect between foreign policy intelligence sources and policy documents. Following this Introduction, a chapter titled "Setting the Scene" examines U.S. Arctic policy and the relationship between intelligence and foreign policy. The chapter "Theoretical Framework" explains how constructivism, discourse theory and critical discourse analysis views language and text as shaping perceptions and creating cultures of understanding. A chapter titled "Data" introduces the intelligence and policy datasets followed by sections for micro-, meso- and macro-levels of analysis that incorporate sentiment analysis and content analysis. The "Findings" chapter summarizes the multi-tiered analysis of the U.S. intelligence data's non-securitized stance towards Russian engagement in the Arctic. To wrap up, the Conclusion summarizes the findings and makes predictions about the future of Arctic intelligence and policy.

My analysis detects a pattern of low-level of classification in State Department and private intelligence documents. Patterns in tagging and email coding in both State Department and private intelligence emphasize a political (as opposed to a defense) focus in the documents. References to locations (also called "location entities") imply a consistent perception of the Arctic as a region or

issue that is global in nature, but with a Western European emphasis. Patterns in sentiment analysis of all documents fail to return a consistently negative-sentiment trend. When findings are viewed collectively, a consistent non-securitized pattern emerges in how State Department and private intelligence personnel assess Russian Arctic engagement. These patterns in intelligence data agree with content and sentiment patterns in U.S. Arctic policy.

Chapter 2 Setting the Scene

Despite Russia representing a long-standing adversary that has been the subject of decades of U.S. intelligence collection and observation, Russia is still a surprisingly aggressive actor on the modern world stage. The U.S. appeared to have been caught off-guard by Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, surprised again by Russian engagement in greater Ukraine, and uncertain about Russian behaviors in the Arctic. The United States continues to seek political solutions to increasingly problematic relations between Russia and the West.

U.S. concern about Russian behavior at its border with Ukraine is inextricably tied to behavior along its northern border in the Arctic. U.S.-backed sanctions[1] have hamstrung development of Russian Arctic oil and gas reserves in the high Arctic. Particularly affected are the Yamal LNG development project[2] and the Sakhalin gas project[3]. Russia relies on collaboration with international and multinational partners to develop its vital shipping infrastructure and energy resources in the Arctic. It lacks the industrial-technical capacity to meet its economic imperative to develop the Arctic region. Russia's need for international cooperation to pursue its goals in the Arctic bodes well for peace in the region. Nevertheless in 2014 and 2015, Russian jets appeared with increased frequency

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[1] Bureau of Industry and Security, and Eric L. Hirschhorn, "Federal Register: Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List." *Department Of Commerce*, August 25, 2015, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-09-02/pdf/2015-21682.pdf.

[2] James Marso and Selina Williams, "Sanctions Bite Massive Gas Project in Russian Arctic," *Wall Street Journal*, August 27, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctions-bite-massive-gas-project-in-russian-arctic-1440667802.

[3] Atle Staalesen, "New US Sanctions against Russian Oil," *Eye on the Arctic*, August 10, 2015, http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/08/10/new-us-sanctions-against-russian-oil/.

in Alaskan, Finnish and Norwegian airspace. During this same period Russian submarines were detected in Arctic and sub-Arctic territorial waters of other Arctic states.

Concerns regarding Russia's Arctic agenda are not new. At one time or another all of the Arctic states have publicly expressed concern over Russia's Arctic behavior; however, that concern has not always become a securitized stance. Some of the Arctic states have been more outspoken about their concerns than others. Speaking in 2007 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Finland's Minister of Defense Jyri Häkämies said of Russia, "... given our geographical location, the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia, and Russia – and not only for Finland, but for all of us.[4]" Russia is the only non-Western Arctic nation, and historically it has had the most contentious relationships with its near neighbors. The West treats Russia with some disregard for its historically brutish military behavior, hawkish foreign policy, reckless environmental practices, questionable business standards, and callous mistreatment of its indigenous peoples, journalists, and other Kremlin-opposing dissenters.

The media has at times taken a "securitized" stance towards Russian engagement in the Arctic before the U.S. government has done so. Media sources from *Newsweek* to *The Economist* speculate about the Russian Arctic threat, and pundits take turns shaming, eulogizing, and fetishizing Arctic oil.

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[4] Jyri Häkämies, "Finland: Similar Yet Different," Transcript presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): Statesmen's Forum, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/070910_sf_hakamies.pdf.

Sentiments about Russia's plans for the Arctic range from pessimism, to concern, to outright alarm. Yet these behaviors that cause such consternation within the Western media about expanded Russian Arctic military developments and thirst for Arctic oil are the outcome of publically available Russian Arctic policy. Russian Arctic policy, signed in 2008 and made available to the public in 2009 quite clearly outlines its Arctic strategy in three phases, of which Russia is currently completing phase two. This policy includes expanded military and border control functions, development of the region for oil and gas extraction, and infrastructure improvements for increased shipping activity[5].

Western media has documented its concern over Russian Arctic engagement, and recent events, including increased incursions of Russia in other nations' air space and territorial waters, substantiate this concern. Like Western media, the U.S. government could also have perceived and discussed Russian Arctic military development in the early 2000s with alarm. But until very recently, neither official U.S. Arctic policy nor U.S. Arctic engagement demonstrated significant levels of concern about Russian activities in the Arctic.

U.S. perceptions of Russia in the Arctic-theater shape U.S. Arctic policy and intelligence is one key factor in assessing and determining threat. Intelligence is a building block of policy, and a complicated symbiosis exists between the policy-making world and the intelligence community (IC). The intelligence process collects the raw data, separates the wheat from the chaff,

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[5] "Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020," Russian Federation, 2009, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/29%20Russian%20Arctic%20Strategy%20Until%202020%20BW.pdf.

and presents the policy-making community with analysis: the intelligence product. Many decisions shape the collection and synthesis of this intelligence data, and these decisions are driven by perceptions of threat and risk.

Intelligence is created in service of policy-makers. Not all intelligence products are incorporated into policy. Primarily intelligence functions to contextualize on-the-ground developments for actors who formulate national security policy. Writes Jason U. Manosevitz for the CIA's *Studies in Intelligence*, "U.S. policymakers want intelligence that helps them avoid surprise, understand evolving developments, and identify opportunities to advance U.S. objectives or avoid risks to national security interests."[6] Intelligence products can come in the form of reports, summaries, briefings, but also in the form of participation in advisory bodies. This is the case with U.S. Arctic intelligence, which is built from advisory bodies and committees representing an array of agencies.

A 2011 joint report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) led by Greg Treverton, former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), states quite clearly that ". . . IC officials play advisory roles at meetings at every level of the interagency policy process."[7] U.S. Arctic policy is

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[6]Jason U. Manosevitz, "Needed: More Thinking about Conceptual Frameworks for Analysis—The Case of Influence," *Studies in Intelligence*, Bolstering Analytic Tradecraft, 57, no. 4 (December 2013): 15–22, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-57-no-4/pdfs/Manosevitz-FocusingConceptual%20Frameworks-Dec2013.pdf.

[7]."Probing the Implications of Changing the Outputs of Intelligence, A Report of the 2011 Analyst-IC Associate Teams Program," *Studies in Intelligence*, Products or Outputs?, 56, no. 1 (March 2012): 1–11, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-

predominantly informed by interagency bodies, all of which include security and intelligence representation. Interagency steering committees on U.S. Arctic policy include the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC), the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC), and the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs (OPA). Agencies within four executive branch departments participate in inter-agency committees on U.S. Arctic policy as part of the U.S.'s 17-member intelligence community. These departments are the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Security Agency (NSA). In addition, other agencies active in U.S. Arctic policy such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the National Science Technology Council (NSTC), the Department of the Interior (DOI), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have strong ties to defense and national security entities. The State Department, one of this research project's sources, is a key actor in Arctic policy, and represents the United States at the Arctic Council.

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studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-1/pdfs-vol-56.-no.-1/Products%20or%20Outputs%20-Extracts-Mar12-20Apr12.pdf.

2.1 U.S. Arctic Policy

U.S. Arctic policy is in a period of change. The last twenty years have seen a slow increase in governmental concern for Arctic affairs as reflected in the increased number of Arctic policy documents from U.S. government agencies. Yet this increase does not obviate the strikingly few public statements about the Arctic in the early part of the 2000s. Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski told the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee at the U.S. Arctic Opportunities Hearing: "...I can state with some certainty here that in 2005, the State Department was just not prepared to have a discussion on [Arctic] issues."[8] External actors share this perception that federal U.S. Arctic policy lagged and lacked vigor. While Canada and Russia take more hawkish stances, and Iceland and the Scandinavian Arctic nations mobilize in response to economic incentives, the U.S., for much of the early 2000s, remained largely aloof in Arctic affairs. It was only in 2014 that the U.S. appointed a high ranking official to the Arctic Council, while other nations have long had ambassador-level politicians seated at the table. The U.S. remains the only Arctic state that is not party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and while it is non-Arctic domestic concerns[9] that inform the decision, the U.S.'s refusal to ratify the treaty limits its ability to advance Arctic dialogue, or coordinate international efforts. The U.S. also lags

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[8] Murkowski, Sen. Lisa. *United States Arctic Opportunities Hearing: Opening Remarks*. Washington D.C., March 5 2015. http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/3/united-states-arctic-opportunities-hearing.

[9] Patrick J. Bonner, "Neo-Isolationists Scuttle UNCLOS," SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v033/33.2.bonner.html.

behind other nations in its ice-ready fleet. Despite having the largest military and navy in the world, the U.S. has the least capable above-surface fleet, for use in Arctic conditions, of the five Arctic littoral states.[10] Russia far surpasses the U.S. in modern icebreakers and ice-capable vessels, and soon, even non-Arctic states, such as India and China, will have more modern and more robust Arctic fleets than the United States. The U.S. Arctic also has the least infrastructure north of latitude 66, lacking in deep water ports, mobile bases for military or rescue operations, roads and other land-based transportation infrastructure. While officials from Alaska,[11] and heads of the U.S. Coast Guard and National Science Foundation[12] have spoken frankly in public about U.S. deficiencies in the Arctic, their concerns are not reflected in U.S. Arctic policy, engagement, or spending. These frank assessments from a spectrum of actors have not galvanized the federal government into action in the Arctic.

The U.S.'s anemic engagement in the Arctic contrasts starkly with other Arctic states' engagement, in particular that of Russia. U.S. Arctic policy documents will be analyzed for content and sentiment, to see whether U.S. policy corresponds with the sentiment and content found in U.S. Arctic intelligence documents.

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[10] The Arctic Littoral States are nations with coastal Arctic waters. These are, organized by length of coastline: Russia, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), United States and Norway.

[11] An example of this is Senator Murkowski's public response to President Obama's Executive Order regarding ANWR, discussed in such press coverage as "Murkowski's primal scream on ANWR points to Alaska's precarious balance" Christian Science Monitor, and in statements made from the Senate Floor to the Senate Energy Committee on January 28, 2015 "Sen. Murkowski: Alaska Will Not be Treated as a Territory"

[12] *Implementing U.S. Policy in the Arctic*, Washington D.C., July 23 2014, http://transportation.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=386881.

2.2 The Link between Intelligence and Policy

This research project focuses on the link between intelligence and policy. The relationship is convoluted, and because of the complex array of influences on U.S. foreign policies, this project will not attempt to attribute or assert causality between intelligence and U.S. Arctic policy. To do so would go well beyond the scope of this project. To summarize the connection between intelligence and policy: data acquired during intelligence collection is sifted and combined to become intelligence analytical products. These analytical products are presented to policy makers who may accept, change or ignore them. Policy subsequently may become government action; however implementation depends on factors such as political climate, significant actor engagement, budgetary considerations, and other conditions.

The transformation of data to action has been popularly described by the "DIKW pyramid," symbolizing a hierarchy of knowing which is based in "data" and ascends into increasingly actionable forms of "information," "knowledge" and finally (and somewhat elusively) "wisdom." This hierarchical, unidirectional formula, while providing a template for the processing and refining of data that informs analysis, ignores the interplay between multidirectional and varied influences that shape understanding and the transmission of knowledge.

Much has been written on the highly complex relationship between policy and intelligence. National security expert, retired IC professional and scholar

Mark Lowenthal defines intelligence as "information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs."[13] Lowenthal stresses the active role of policy-makers in shaping intelligence research and findings. Richard K. Betts, another influential expert in both the practice and discourse surrounding the IC, describes the IC as providing "the library function for national security: it keeps track of all sources, secret or not, and mobilizes them in coherent form whenever non-expert policymakers call for them."[14] On the other hand, Paul Pillar, of CIA pedigree, describes the relationship between intelligence and policy as "a dysfunctional relationship...broken and badly need(ing) repair."[15] Statements like Pillar's drive the inquiry of this research project. Could there be a broken link between analysis and policy-making that explains the U.S.'s lack of engagement in the Arctic despite potentially troubling Russian actions in the region. The needs of the policy-makers, the instincts of intelligence analysts, real-world developments, and access to information shape the relationship between intelligence collection, intelligence products and policy-making.

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[13] Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Los Angeles: CQ Press College, 2011), 1.

[14] Richard K Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 6.

[15] Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 15, doi:10.2307/20031908.

Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework

This chapter explains how answers to the research questions are to be found in this text-based dataset. To reprise, the research questions are: 1) To what extent did intelligence sources securitize Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s? and 2) Does the discourse of U.S. intelligence about Russian engagement in the Arctic align with the discourse of U.S. Arctic policy?

3.1 Building a Hypothesis

The research questions aim to discern whether threat was detected in this dataset, but the findings have larger implications. If, for example, threat is detected and communicated within the intelligence dataset, but not within the policy documents of a corresponding timeframe, the findings suggest a disconnection between intelligence and policy. Similarly, if minimal language about risks and threats exists in the intelligence dataset, but much language about threat exists in the policy documents this will also suggest a disconnect between the two groups. This discord could result from any of the factors mentioned in the previous chapter on the link between intelligence and policy. Similarities in narrative patterns and level of threat detection indicate that the two groups share information and that they are in agreement about on-the-ground developments and their significance with regard to U.S. national security and

sovereign interests. To explain how I came to my hypotheses, I will adapt John Nash's 1950 historic *Nash Equilibrium* for understanding this dynamic:

Table 1 Applying the Nash equilibrium

	Policy - low threat	**Policy - high threat**
Intelligence - low threat	agreement	disconnect
Intelligence - high threat	disconnect	agreement

Disconnection between the various narratives suggests that the discourse within one group is not extending into other group. Agreement implies trust and shared discourse between the two groups; however, agreement could stem from parallel discourses that arrive at the same conclusion.

While not ideal, disconnects between intelligence and policy is commonplace. Such a finding would not be unexpected in this research project. An unexpected finding of this project would be agreement between the two groups on a high level of threat. This finding is unexpected, not because Russian Arctic engagements during this time were *not* a threat to the future of U.S. sovereign interests, but because U.S. behavior during this time frame does not reflect a perception of high threat. Additionally, given the common understanding of U.S. Arctic policy documents during the early 2000s, unearthing patterns of discourse evincing a high perception of threat would be quite surprising.

My understanding of U.S. Arctic policy and U.S. Arctic behavior rests on my own daily observations over several years of open source monitoring of Arctic developments across a wide spectrum of issues. In light of this set of observations I expect to find that policy reflects a low level of threat detection. The question is whether intelligence will have similar or different narrative structures from policy: that is to say different content, sentiment, keywords, geographic focus, and ultimately, a different level of threat perception.

Table 2 Refining the hypothesis

	Policy - low threat	**Policy - high threat**
Intelligence - low threat	agreement	~~disconnection~~
Intelligence - high threat	disconnection	~~agreement~~

Given U.S. Arctic behavior over the last several years, I hypothesize that, like U.S. Arctic policy, discourse in U.S. intelligence will not have securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that actors in the intelligence and policy arenas share information on the Arctic. The lack of U.S. federal budgetary expenditure for Arctic security during this time period supports these assumptions and predictions. A high level of threat detected by intelligence likely would have resulted in budgetary support for Arctic security. I hypothesize that the intelligence community did not securitize Russian engagement in the Arctic, just as the policy-making community did not securitize Russia's behavior in the Arctic.

To understand the discourse taking place in these data sources the research methods must detect patterns in text, must be able to pull out and examine signifiers of threat and risk, and must trace pathways of transmission: how was this information about Russia, the Arctic, and degrees of threat disseminated? I rely on critical discourse analysis and the principles of discourse theory to examine and characterize the discourse surrounding U.S. perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic.

Discourse theory applies because the dataset consists of text-based documents from a private intelligence firm and the State Department that are viewed here as digital conversations. As a whole, I treat this dataset as one section of a larger discourse occurring in intelligence circles and within the federal government in which a consensus on the level of Russian threat from its Arctic ambitions emerges. Capturing the nature of the discourse, that is to say, discerning who was included in the conversation and what terms the intelligence community applied to the conversation, and looking for any signifiers of threat or risk in the text as perceived by the people involved in the conversation, will produce answers to this project's research questions. In short, a thorough examination of the discourse documented by this dataset will shed light on questions about securitization and the level of agreement between intelligence circles and policy-making circles on perceived threats in Russia's Arctic engagement.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) considers the power of language and discourse to shape ideas and human actions. CDA guides my examination of the processes of creation and transmission of the discourse contained in the intelligence and policy data, as well as its content. These theories guide inquiry into the actors and forces that shape the text: it is not only the content but also the creators, publishers and distributors of this data who cultivate impressions of Russia, of threat, of the Arctic, and of U.S. strategic interests at home and abroad. The following elaborates on the theories of discourse and critical discourse analysis that inform the methods employed in this thesis.

3.2 Why Does Text Have Meaning?

Cultural theorist Stuart Hall writes that discourse "constructs the topic. It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about."[1] Discourse theory supports the assertion of this research project that digital conversations U.S. intelligence community members had about Russian engagement in the Arctic formed their understanding of Russia in the Arctic. According to Hall and other discourse theorists, discourse drives, rather than reflects, understanding. The acts of naming, categorizing, and speaking create meaning and also identity.

Discourse not only informs, it also frames, contextualizes, and creates significance. Cultural theorist Michel Foucault defines discourse as "'a group of

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[1] Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates. *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (SAGE, 2001), 21.

statements which provide a language for talking about - a way of representing the knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular historical moment…"[2] This project aims to capture how the U.S. intelligence dataset presented and communicated ideas about Russia in the Arctic in the early 2000s. Additionally the project examines whether this same discursive position towards Russia appeared in U.S. Arctic policy. During this time period, did discursive ideas about Russia in the Arctic in the intelligence dataset agree with U.S. policy?

Foucault called this sharing of perception discursive formation. In *Archaeology of Knowledge* he writes that by referring to the same object, even statements originating from different contexts form a discourse: "statements different in form, and dispersed in time, form a group if they refer to one and the same object."[3] In my analysis, I subscribe to this theory that views conversations about the same topic as the same conversation, or discourse.

Using an example of discourse on mental illness given in *Archaeology of Knowledge,* Foucault explains that discourse on any topic is "constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own."[4] However, accessing and coalescing all the discourse in the world on Russia's engagement in the Arctic is impossible. Discourse theory

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge* (Psychology Press, 2002), 35.

[4] Ibid.

allows the examination of patterns and influences in a subset of the entire conversation to capture major themes of the conversation. Furthermore this project relies on the concept of discursive formations to determine whether intelligence sources and policy sources were in agreement on the matter of Russia and the Arctic.

Discourse theory, in its definitions of identity-creation through discourse, also stresses the significance of excluded ideas: information deemed not a part of the discourse. Hall calls this a process of "rules in" and "rules out."[5] The separation of 'in group' from an 'out group'; the ways in which discourse is about or not about something is one of the foundational concepts of this research project. What should be made of the things *not said* by intelligence community members about Russian engagement in the Arctic? What a certain discourse, particularly one pertinent to intelligence, which operationalizes knowledge, does not mention is as significant as what it does mention. Therefore in addition to detecting patterns of text contained in this discourse, I identify pertinent topics that are not discussed, places that are not mentioned, ways in which information is not classified or categorized, people who are not included in the conversation, and so on. While greatly expanding the scope of analysis, these theories about othering, creating rules, and shaping what a discourse is "about" or "not about" aid this project in understanding the non- securitization of Russian engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s. Examining what the discourse contains and what

[5] Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates. *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (SAGE, 2001), 72.

it ignores will illuminate: 1) what this discourse is about, and 2) whether risk was or was not attributed to Russian actions. Moreover, careful analysis of content will identify the level of threat detected from Russian engagement in the Arctic during this time.

3.3 Are Threat and Risk Communicated in Special Ways?

Despite Russia's overt activities in the Arctic, and despite the U.S. having one of the most vast intelligence networks in the world, the U.S. is only slowly beginning to securitize Russian behavior in the Arctic in late 2015. On November 10, 2015 Secretary of State John Kerry said, "Our future national security strategy is going to be affected also by what's going on in the Arctic.… Economic riches tend to attract military interest as nations seek to ensure their own rights are protected. And we know, because we track it, that these countries – like Russia, China, and others – are active in the Arctic."[6] Alaska senators Lisa Murkowski and Dan Sullivan have been calling for such higher-level engagement in Arctic security issues for some time. Earlier in the year, during a May 2015 hearing for the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter acknowledged that the U.S. was "late in recognizing"[7] the strategic importance of the Arctic and Russia's intentions there. Army General Martin E. Dempsey echoed this sentiment by saying, "we really just got started on this two years ago,"[8] in regard to strategic planning in the Arctic.

For a policymaker or a member of the State Department, at a certain point a given topic may enter a new realm, a threatening realm. At this point an event

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[6] Sec. of State John Kerry, "Remarks on Climate Change and National Security," *U.S. Department of State*, November 10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/249393.htm.

[7] "Secretary Carter and General Dempsey Testimony on Defense Department's 2016 Budget," *C-SPAN.org,* May 6 2015, accessed July 6 2015, http://www.c-span.org/video/?325804-1/secretary-carter-general-dempsey-testimony-defense-departments-2016-budget.

[8] Ibid.

or a potential event becomes perceived as a risk to national security, or becomes "securitized." Take, for example, shoes. Shoes in their daily context are non-threatening and do not affect national security. After a 2001 attempted shoe bombing on an American Airlines flight, shoes on airplanes came to be viewed as a risk and potential threat. Since the 2001 incident air travelers have grown accustomed to having their shoes x-rayed before they are deemed safe and, essentially, de-securitized. The x-raying of shoes in airports is an extension of policy that is implemented to protect national security. Security studies and discourse overlap in theories about the securitizing speech act.

The Copenhagen School's Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde call the specific language moment vested with the potential to securitize an issue the speech act. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue that spoken language, in the right setting has the capacity to securitize an issue. The circumstances they outline for a successful securitizing speech act include a speaker with appropriate authority addressing the right audience in the proper venue at the right moment and in the proper manner. Without said authority, words of caution and alarm essentially fall on deaf ears. Says Pierre Bourdieu on the matter of the speech act, "the performative utterance is destined to fail each time that it is not pronounced by a person who has the 'power' to pronounce it."[9] He goes on to further outline how attempts at securitization without authority will fail: "...the success of these operations of social magic - comprised by acts of authority, or,

[9] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*. Reprint edition. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 111.

what amounts to the same thing, authorized acts - is dependent on the combination of a systematic set of interdependent conditions which constitute social rituals."[10]

Ultimately Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde assert that concepts can become securitized and spur human action. Nicholas Onuf, in his book *World of Our Making*, examines how repeated speech acts can become social practice. Specifically he explores how speech acts become social rules: how 'constitution' becomes 'institution.'[11] Onuf thus blends constructivist logic with speech act theory, and I employ this point of view in this research project. Researchers Gavan Duffy and Brian Federking in their 2009 article "Changing the Rules: A Speech Act Analysis of the End of the Cold War," captured how I view the link between text/language and government action: "As patterns of speech act interaction recur, they become regularized as practices. They may ultimately become codified as social rules, collections of which comprise institutions… Speech acts (construed broadly to include nonverbal acts that convey meaning) thereby serve as the foundational medium of the co-constitution of agents and structure."[12]

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

[12] Gavan Duffy, and Brian Frederking, "Changing the Rules: A Speech Act Analysis of the End of the Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2009): 325–47, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27735099.

For example, President George Bush's 2003 State of the Union speech about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction in which he said the now infamous sixteen words "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa"[13] could be viewed as a prime example of a securitizing speech act. In this moment, the Bush administration gained the authority from its citizens and, simultaneously, justification before the world to engage in war in Iraq. The fact that this statement was later proven false only further supports the argument for the potency of the securitizing speech act. In the right circumstance a speech act can be so effective that it does not even need to be true in order to justify, for example, decades of war costing trillions of dollars. This raises the question of whether the U.S.'s failure to securitize Russian engagement in the Arctic can be seen as a failed speech act.

Theorist Judith Butler sees the speech act in a less monolithic way than her counterparts in Copenhagen. In her article "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech" she questions one of the fundaments of Buzan et al's securitizing speech act theory: the capacity of words to be actions. In "Burning Acts" Butler responds to J. L. Austin's formative *How to Do Things with Words*, in which Butler examines the capacity of words to be, in and of themselves, actions. Butler interprets Austinian logic to view the speaker as the doer, when she writes "The subject as sovereign is presumed in the Austinian account… the figure for the one who

[13] "President Delivers 'State of the Union,'" George Bush Whitehouse Archives, January 28 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

speaks and, in speaking, performs what she/he speaks, is the judge or some other representative of the law."[14] It is however the notion that the words themselves do action that Butler describes as the "apparent coincidence of signifying and enacting."[15] Butler, building on Austin's seminal example, examines the relationship between words and action in much of her work; these theories support this research in achieving its goal of equating the words of intelligence and policy with the actions of the U.S. government.

Butler's work in *Excitable Speech* continues with the examination of word and deed. However in the passage that follows she considers the limits of the power of the speaker: "...the act of a speaking body, is always to some extent unknowing about what it performs, that it always says something that it does not intend, and that it is not the emblem of mastery or control that it sometimes purports to be."[16] Could, as Butler points out, the intelligence "speaking body" in this dataset have been the unknowing, un-masterful body? Could intelligence speech acts have been saying something 'it (did) not intend', and did this result in the U.S.' non-securitized stance on Russian engagement in the Arctic? Or could the IC have failed to clearly articulate a threat it did perceive? Or, alternatively,

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[14] Judith Butler, "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech," *The University of Chicago Law Roundtable: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Legal Studies* 3,1, Article 9 (1996), 203, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol3/iss1/9.

[15] Ibid, 200.

[16] Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 10, http://monoskop.org/images/5/54/Butler_Judith_Excitable_Speech_A_Politics_of_the_Performative_1997.pdf.

along the vein of the inquiry in *Burning Acts*, do the words themselves do the action?

Careful examination of the dataset suggests that in the United States in the early 2000s, neither intelligence sources nor policy-making sources issued a speech act that securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic. Nor does the dataset reveal any "unsuccessful" securitizing speech act, at least not on the part of U.S. sources that are the focus of this research. Nor was there an unintended, "un-masterful" securitization by U.S. sources of Russian engagement in the Arctic. The matter of locus of action and of *doing,* however, raises an interesting question. If U.S. engagement is marked by inaction, and the language itself is passive, perhaps Butler's theory sheds light on how words become government action. The question that remains, a question that is beyond the scope of this project, is whether these two communities were right in their threat assessments.

3.4 What Does a Securitizing Speech Act Look Like as Text?

This project assumes that I can identify and profile a securitized statement in a large amount of text. Yet securitization theory created by the Copenhagen School is not a practitioner's theory, and little research has been done to systematically identify methods for identifying securitizing speech acts. NSF-commissioned research in 1980 attempted to reconcile speech act theory with natural language processing,[17] however the attempt exposed the limitations of the theory in practice in artificial intelligence (AI) and computational linguistics.

To complicate the matter, the Copenhagen School views securitization as inherently inter-subjective. Securitizing speech acts require multiple actors to engage with one another and acknowledge perception of threat. That is, securitizing speech acts require consent of the audience in accepting the security risk conveyed by the speaker. In this research project the audience is intelligence actors and the policy-maker.

In this project 'security-speak' is identified through multiple processes. The analytical tools are designed to identify trends and patterns, but they would not be appropriate for finding one, specific speech act. Instead the project employs theory to determine whether large-scale securitization has or has not occurred. For context, in 2010 journalist and data visualization expert Jonathan Stray visualized the Iraqi Warlogs released by Wikileaks. The visualization and analysis of Stray's team starkly differs in content from the data analyzed for this

[17] William C. Mann, "Toward a Speech Act Theory for Natural Language Processing," University Of Southern California - Marina Del Rey Information Sciences Institute, 1980, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA087250.

research project. Key terms detected in Stray's analysis[18] included words: mortar, civ killed shot, injured, handcuffed, blindfolded, corpse, abducted, and detonated. Stray's analysis unequivocally captures the nature of these documents: records of war that detail the nature and cause of human casualties. This constitutes what could be called *post-securitized speech*, because it describes not the moments in which Iraq became a security concern for the U.S., but the moments of cataloging active warfare.

[18] Jonathan Stray, "A Full-Text Visualization of the Iraq War Logs,"*Jonathanstray.com*, December 10, 2010, http://jonathanstray.com/a-full-text-visualization-of-the-iraq-war-logs.

3.5 What Would Securitization Look Like in This Research Project?

For this project I look for words that communicate fear, mistrust, and perceptions of threat or risk: language that, unlike Stray's work mentioned above, pre-dates and spurs armed conflict or the end of politics as usual. This includes words that capture tension such as: argue, attack, terror, fear, risk, threat, crisis, criticism, corrupt, conflict, defense, security, destroy, fight, grievance, hazard, and so on, are a part of the analysis. It is the language of tension, of discord, that will allow the analyst to dig deeper into the line-by-line text to discern securitized or non-securitized speech.

A pattern of securitized discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic would be consistently tagged by document creators/senders as a defense or security issue, and would be communicated directly to and consistently with key defense and security actors at high frequency. A securitized discourse would be highly focused on Russian political and military actors and on developments in the geographic region of the Russian Arctic. To counter developments in Russian locations, operatives would discuss American Arctic defense capabilities, in the U.S. Arctic or through partnerships with Canada / NORAD, Iceland, NATO, and others. The securitized discourse would be negative in sentiment due to the centrality of words about threat and risk to the discourse. Widespread patterns representing perceptions of threat and risk would convince me that a securitized discourse was taking place.

3.6 Why Would the United States Securitize Russian Engagement in the Arctic?

To delve deeper into the theory that frames this research, it is useful to examine which issues would drive the U.S. to securitize Russian involvement in the Arctic. Thus far I have outlined the pertinent issues related to intelligence, U.S. Arctic policy, communication between intelligence and policy, the role of language in shaping human perception, the securitizing speech act and Foucauldian ideas about discursive formations. This section explores why the U.S. would securitize Russian engagement in the Arctic region.

A "security" issue threatens the identity of the state, the sovereign territory of the state, or the strategic interests of the state. These issues could be economic, they could threaten the values of the state, or they could threaten the values of key constituents or stakeholder groups. What constitutes a security issue has expanded in the last few decades to incorporate the role of "soft" (non-military) issues. For the U.S., the following "soft" concerns could potentially become security issues in the Arctic: indigenous rights, environmental protection, commercial fishing rights, oil and gas exploration, and sovereign territory, to name a few. Fear or distrust of Russia by U.S. citizens, spurred on by negative media coverage, could also securitize an issue. Hard security issues that would affect the security dynamic include military build-up that creates a marked imbalance of offensive power between the two nations, or that lowers the level of trust between Russia and the U.S. (or U.S. allies).

While most Arctic security experts[19] argue that there will never be literal or land warfare in the geographic area of the Arctic, Russian engagement in the Arctic could still become securitized. Securitization does not always mean armed conflict, but the threat of armed conflict becomes more likely once an issue is securitized. With that in mind, it is noteworthy that many of the aforementioned soft concerns and hard security interests of the U.S. in the Arctic listed above had already been identified during the time frame examined for this research project.

Russia had already begun to develop its military infrastructure in the Arctic, increasing the imbalance between U.S. and Russian military capacity. The U.S. media had already begun to register alarm over Russian Arctic engagement. Russian encroachment on other states' territories and illegal fishing in the Arctic has been well documented. Russia's poor environmental standards and improper handling of Soviet era nuclear and other hazardous waste has already polluted Arctic waterways and air space, and Russia has shown little initiative in mitigating these issues. The potential for securitization is high, yet U.S. response to these developments remains muted.

A contemporary example of an issue that has become securitized but remains an unarmed-conflict is China's development in the South China Sea (SCS). Similarities abound between China's behavior in the SCS and Russia's

[19] See for example the 2008 Department of National Intelligence report "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," the 2011 Department of Defense "Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage" or the 2014 report from Center for a New American Security, "Emerging Arctic Security Challenges"

behavior in the Arctic. These similarities include conflicting views over: fishing rights, maritime boundaries, military and civilian developments that displace trust with neighbors, the role of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and freedom of navigation, ambiguous legal frameworks, and the potential for oil and gas resource development. Scholars such as Erik Franckx in *Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and American Perspectives*, Michael Byers, in the 2014 article "The UN and the Law of the Sea: From the Arctic to the South China Sea," Nong Hong and co-editors of the 2015 book *UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the South China Sea*, and others are beginning to consider the similarities between Russia's behavior in the Arctic and China's behavior in the SCS. Despite multiple similarities, the U.S. has taken a harder stance toward China's behavior in the SCS than it has to Russia's engagement in the Arctic. The U.S. has flown reconnaissance missions and sent multiple Navy surveillance missions in this disputed area, vigorously asserting the U.S. position that UNCLOS does not "negate[s] the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) without coastal state notice or consent."[20] This behavior has angered the Chinese, and has resulted in multiple incidents that could spark armed conflict between the two powers. Writes maritime scholar Felix Chang for the Foreign Policy Research Institute's blog *Geopoliticus* in May of 2015, "…the United

[20] Bonnie Glaser, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea - Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14," *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 2012, http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883#.

States also revealed that it is considering sending its ships and surveillance aircraft within 12 nautical miles-the internationally recognized territorial zone around natural islands- of China's newly-built islands … if that happens, an incident between U.S. and Chinese forces may well take place."[21] After the publication of Chang's article the U.S. sent B-52 bombers into the region, sending a strong signal to Beijing about U.S. views.

In contrast, the U.S. has taken no such action in the Russian Arctic or in response to Russian Arctic claims, which also include a dispute about freedom of navigation. Instead, Russian bombers buzz U.S. and NATO airspace. The U.S. still aspires, at least in public statements, to maintain cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The U.S. has securitized, but not engaged in conflict with China with regard to its actions in South China Sea. By comparison U.S. behavior towards Russia in response to Russian engagement in the Arctic has not been as strong.

[21] Felix Chang, "Ready for a Fight?: How America Could Respond to a South China Sea Crisis," *Geopoliticus*, May 2015, http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2015/05/ready-fight-how-america-could-respond-south-china-sea-crisis.

3.7 How Does Discourse Theory Function as Methodology?

This research applies discourse theory by using critical discourse analysis in three tiers: micro-, meso-, and macro-level analysis. The micro-level of analysis examines content patterns, essentially asking "what" questions such as: what is this data discussing. The meso-level of analysis looks at production and distribution practices that surround the data, answering the "how" and "who" questions surrounding *how* this data come to be and *who* created and read this data. The macro-level of analysis examines intertextual dialogue, how these texts interact in a discursive fashion. It is in this level of analysis that the U.S. Arctic policy documents enter the analytical process. The analysis seeks similarities and differences between content of the intelligence dataset and policy dataset. This multi-tiered process implemented with the help of a set of analytical tools should illuminate consistent trends and patterns in U.S. discourse surrounding Russian engagement in the Arctic.

This tiered analysis is necessary because intelligence is simultaneously a process and a product. More so, in intelligence both the process and the product are governed by complex rules of dissemination (commonly called "classification") that restrict access and control flows of communication. In a 2012 article "Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?" in *Intelligence and National Security*, Mark Jensen cites faulty process as one of the three foundational concepts most likely to result in

intelligence failure.[22] He stresses the process that creates successful or failed intelligence. Therefore it is important to examine the process of intelligence creation to assay discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic. This thinking is supported by theory. In *Questions of Method* Michel Foucault describes how analysis is shaped by many factors, including the process by which the analysis itself is created. Careful analysis must, according to Foucault, include both a critique of the analytical process, and all adjoining territory of influence upon the analysis. This research project employs a multi-tiered approach that stresses the significance of discourse formation in order to honor these conceptual requirements.

[22] Mark A. Jensen, "Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?," *Intelligence and National Security* 27, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 261–82, doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.661646.

Chapter 4 Data

This research examines U.S. perceptions of Russia in the Arctic that originate in the intelligence and policy-maker communities in an attempt to understand U.S. non-engagement in the Arctic. To extract meaning from this text-based dataset I use discourse theory and critical discourse analysis. These theoretical frameworks should illuminate widespread patterns in content and in classification of the data that answer the question of whether intelligence securitzed Russia's actions in the Arctic.

The data set spans the years from 2004 to 2015 and includes 600+ documents comprised of official U.S. Arctic policy, internal emails of a private U.S. intelligence firm, and diplomatic cables from the State Department. In their entirety they comprise 1,468,509 words and roughly 3,000 typed pages. This dataset is made available through the actions of the hacker group Anonymous and leaker Pfc. Chelsea Manning in coordination with the government transparency site Wikileaks. The three sources create a comprehensive slice of U.S. discourse about Russia in the Arctic and are private or classified information that is traceable to its sources. That being said, intelligence solely from defense agencies could strengthen the research performed here; however none was publically available. *En masse*, the data helps to profile U.S. perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic.

Data visualization and analysis softwares Overview and Textexture support content analysis of this large dataset. Text-mining tools Aylien and AlchemyAPI break the dataset into entities, identify key contexts and provide

sentiment categories of positive, negative, and neutral sentiment. The mapping program CartoDB visualizes locations (also referred to as location entities) mentioned in the dataset.

4.1 Data Origins and Cleaning

The dataset is comprised of 151 cables from the State Department and 508 emails from the private intelligence firm Stratfor. These 659 documents originate from two large-scale leaks published by the pro-transparency organization Wikileaks that, combined, include several million documents. The Stratfor emails are part of the Wikileaks collection the "Global Intelligence Files" (GI Files). The State Department cables are part of the Wikileaks "Cablegate" collection that is housed in their Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy (PlusD).

I selected these documents because they include the words "Arctic" and "Russia," and because they were accessible for extraction from the Wikileaks site with the tools and skills available. The keywords "Arctic" and "Russia" returned intelligence that was not solely about Russia or the Arctic, but pertained to both topics of study for this project. These broad terms allowed for a wide net to be cast ensuring enough data for meaningful analysis. This dataset offers insight into how a private and a government U.S. intelligence group create narratives about Russia in the Arctic.

The emails from the GI Files used for this thesis are mostly open source intelligence collection. Open Source intelligence (OSINT) is material gathered from publicly available information such as news reports. Stratfor internally describes open source as "stuff that's on the internet"[1] and "information from the

[1] "The Stratfor Glossary of Useful, Baffling and Strange Intelligence Terms," *Wikileaks,* accessed March 20, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/The_Stratfor_Glossary_of_Useful_Baffling_and_Strange_Intelligence_Terms.pdf.

public domain circulated and discussed among all employees."[2] Many of these emails are compilations of news media articles on pre-identified topics that regional monitors send to internal email listings for broad distribution.

The documents from the CableGate collection are diplomatic cables, most of which are designated "unclassified." These cables are written by State Department personnel and sent to consulates, embassies, missions and other U.S. government officials and agencies. The CableGate collection was taken by the now-imprisoned leaker Pfc. Chelsea Manning[3] from the U.S. closed communication network SIPRNet.

In the GI Files leak, 11,404 emails contain the words "Arctic" and "Russia." From the Cablegate leak, 155 cables contain the words "Arctic" and "Russia." The eligible dataset for this research project includes a total of 11,559 leaked emails and cables; however only 659 documents from the two collections are analyzed for this study. While still a significantly sized collection in its own right, the two main reasons for this considerably smaller dataset are technical limitations and duplications that will be explained further below.

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[2] Sarah Harrison, "The Global Intelligence Files," *Wikileaks,* accessed January 15, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html.

[3] "United States Diplomatic Cables Leak," *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*, July 7, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak&oldid=670346864.



Figure 1 Data Cleaning Process

The data cleaning process involved several software programs. These programs extracted the data from the source Wikileaks, cleaned the data and transformed it into the right format for upload to five main programs for analysis. The flow diagram below outlines this process.

The table below documents the data management process that determined the final size of the dataset.

Table 3 Data Cleaning Process

Step in process	Detail	# of docs (GI Files/C'gate)
Identification of documents	Documents in Wikileaks' GI Files and Cablegate collections with search words "Arctic" and "Russia"	11,559 (11404/155)
Extraction	• Import.io webcrawler finds and extracts 171 Cablegate documents (more than human-identified 155) • The number of GI Files documents extracted was affected by Wikileaks' limitation of returning only 1,000 (out of 11,404) search records. • Import.io only returned 980 of these 1,000 identified documents.	1,151 (980/171)
Deletion of duplicates	• 187 of the GI Files were duplicate emails, meaning they had the exact same sender, receiver, send date, release date, title and content. • The Cablegate documents had no duplicates.	964 (793/171)
Exclusion of Attachments	• 440 emails from the GI Files contained attachments with content in them that is unextractable using the Import.io software. To note, 13 of these emails comprised a total of 84 of the duplicates mentioned above • The Cablegate documents had no attachments.	679 (508/171)
Documents with large amounts of text	• In the GI Files no deletions were made because of large amounts of text • In Cablegate three documents with excessive amounts of text were deleted for the upload process to the Overview program	676 (508/168)
"Arctic" or Arctic content	After uploading to Overview program it is discovered that not all documents contain the word "Arctic" in the body of the text. This can be explained by the fact that they may have contained the word Arctic in the document title, which was not included in the metadata of the upload to Overview • From GI Files only 384 documents specifically contain the word Arctic; however review shows that most documents that do not make use of the word "Arctic" are still relevant to Arctic issues. • From Cablegate 150 documents specifically contain the word "Arctic" and one document refers to the Arctic without specific use of the word.	659 (508/151)
FINAL		659

While the strengths of this dataset include access to classified and private documents that help capture a discourse at a unique moment in Arctic political history, this research project explores U.S. securitization (or lack thereof) of Russian engagement in the Arctic. These documents stem from a private intelligence firm, and the State Department, primarily foreign policy bodies of the United States. The data set does not include a cache of documents from the primary defense and intelligence bodies of the United States, such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and others. Access to such documents would be helpful for further research certainly, but they were not available for study as they are classified and hence inaccessible.

In summary, this research project analyzes 659 text documents from Wikileaks' GI Files and Cablegate collections containing the words "Arctic" and "Russia." After the initial identification of eligible documents, the process of extracting and cleaning data ultimately determined the size of the dataset analyzed in this project.

4.1.1 Overview of the Data Chapter

This section examines the intelligence and policy data using a three-tiered process of analysis. In order to detect patterns of discourse I processed this text-based data set using a host of analytical tools and approaches. The approaches include content analysis and sentiment analysis methods. The overarching analysis is guided by critical discourse analysis. Data analytics and visualization tools implement this three-tiered analytical approach, and ultimately these

software tools dissect the massive amount of raw text. This multi-faceted approach allows for the data to reveal various patterns and trends, and provides a rich picture of U.S. discourse surrounding Russian engagement in the Arctic.

In reality what I refer to as "the dataset" in this project is actually a collection of three very different data sources. These three different sources allow me to view differences and similarities in the discourse, and to draw out large-scale patterns that take place in all three data sources. The three sources are internal emails from the U.S. private intelligence firm Stratfor, State Department cables, and U.S. Arctic policy documents. This study analyzes the dataset using Norman Fairclough's prescribed CDA method of three-tiered analysis. First, the meso-level of analysis investigates the origins of the dataset. The investigation of origins includes answering questions about the publishing process including how this "secret" data became available to the world; the distribution process, including who was in charge of disseminating this data set, to whom, and why; and the production process, including who created these data.[4] The answers to these questions should reveal a set of influencers upon the dataset that contribute to the discourse at hand, as the motives for creation, internal distribution, and publishing are intrinsic to the nature of the discourse.

At the meso-level of analysis, I will explain how Wikileaks, Anonymous, and Pfc. Chelsea Manning contributed to publishing and distributing the dataset to the global public. This portion of the data chapter also serves to validate the

[4] Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (Harlow, England ; New York: Routledge, 2001), Chapter 7.

dataset as "authentic" communication, which in this case means unadulterated, original digital files. The meso-level of analysis then takes the analysis one layer deeper to examine production procedures, policies and other influencers surrounding the creation of the documents in the dataset by Stratfor employees and State Department officials. This stage includes detecting patterns of sending and receiving, comparing trends in dates of communication and categorization, and defining general nomenclature for categorization and classification. A preliminary sketch of the discourse in this dataset emerges from the meso-level analysis, which subsequent tiers of analysis should substantiate and reinforce. Patterns detected through the meso-level of analysis include a trend toward low-level of classification and open source intelligence, and a trend toward viewing Russia in the Arctic as a political, rather than national security, affair, both of which reinforce this project's hypothesis of a low-level of threat detected from Russia.

The second major inquiry in this chapter provides the micro-level analysis, which examines the content and sentiment of the emails and cables themselves. This process is modeled after Norman Fairclough's writings on the practical application of critical discourse analysis (CDA).[5] Here I employ data analysis tools for text to analyze text-based content patterns, networks of words, and sentiment of the documents. These tools allow me to detect widespread patterns of content and sentiment that shape the discourse of threat posed by Russian engagement in the Arctic.

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[5] Ibid, Chapter 5

Analysis of content is the foundation of the micro-level inquiry. Content analysis performed with the help of data analytics and data visualization tools aims to reveal major themes in the text. Content analysis systematically seeks understanding in text, and the software tools employed here allow for a dashboard view of patterns across the large base of text in the data set. The content analysis will help determine the nature of U.S. IC discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic.

One specific type of content that provides insight into the nature of this discourse is references to geographic locations. All geographic locations mentioned in the IC dataset are mapped. The resulting map is a significant portion of this micro-level of analysis because it illuminates trends of geographic focus, as well as areas that are not a focus of this discourse.

Additionally, I employ sentiment analysis to expand understanding of the nature of the discourse. Sentiment analysis uses text-mining principles with algorithmic weightings applied to language expressing sentiment and opinion. These algorithms are built around banks of words that represent sentiment, emotion and opinion, and natural language processing (NLP), which allows software to identify intention in human language. The program will identify whether a document has negative, positive, or neutral sentiment, which in turn will capture perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic. For example, a large cache of negative sentiment documents which share content about the Prirazlomnoye oil rig or President Dimitry Medvedev would reveal U.S. intelligence perceptions of Russian motives and actions. This process provides

an objective and repeatable valuation of sentiment, which, combined with content analysis, can provide much insight into discursive patterns.

The final phase of this data chapter examines intertextual dialog between the intelligence data set and the Arctic policy documents. This macro-level analysis aims to find consistent patterns and similarities between sentiment and content in U.S. Arctic intelligence and U.S. Arctic policy documents. To do so, first the policy documents are put through a micro-level analysis. The resulting profile is compared with the findings of the micro-level analysis of the intelligence documents to create an understanding of the intertextual dialog, or the macro-level of analysis. By comparing content, location entities, and document sentiment patterns between the IC dataset and policy documents, I can hypothesize about a shared discursive stance (and pinpoint major divergences) to complete the picture of shared threat valuation between the IC and policy-making communities.

4.2 Meso-Level Analysis

The meso-level analysis is broken into two main sections on distribution and production. The Distribution section includes *Wikileaks as Publisher*, describing the illegal conditions under which these leaks became part of the public commons and *Controversy and Significance* that explores the veracity of the data set. Using evidence culled from metadata, the Production section examines influences shaping the creation of this data. A summary of findings

concludes this section on meso-analysis with real-world corroborations of findings.

4.2.1 Distribution

4.2.1.1 Wikileaks as Publisher

The intelligence portion of this dataset is available through the organization Wikileaks and its website www.wikileaks.org. Wikileaks was founded in 2006 and has been described as everything from a nonprofit online media organization[6] to a terrorist organization.[7] Wikileaks' stated purpose is to improve government transparency. It pursues this goal by obtaining and publishing state secrets in an accessible and searchable forum via its website.

Wikileaks obtains its classified information ("leaks") from anonymous sources. Its most famous leaks have included the "2010 Collateral Murder" leak that published dashboard video footage from a U.S. Apache helicopter that captured the murder of civilians and journalists in Iraq,[8] the "Iraq Warlogs" leak,[9] the "Afghan Warlogs"[10] leak, and the "2012 Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy" (PlusD) leak that published stolen State Department diplomatic cables. The Cablegate Collection analyzed in this research project is a part of the PlusD leak.

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[6] Micah L. Sifry and Andrew Rasiej, *WikiLeaks and the Age of Transparency,* (Counterpoint, 2011) 21.

[7] Declan McCullagh, "Congressman Wants WikiLeaks Listed as Terrorist Group," *CNET*, November 28, 2010, Accessed March 26, 2015, http://www.cnet.com/news/congressman-wants-wikileaks-listed-as-terrorist-group/.

[8] The video can be seen on YouTube here. The soldier responsible for this attack speaks about the incident and its aftermath here.

[9] Almost 400,000 United States Army field reports from 2004 - 2009 from combat activities in Iraq, released by Wikileaks in 2010

[10] Approximately 91,000 United States Army field reports from 2004 - 2009 from combat activities in Afghanistan, released by Wikileaks in 2010

US State Department fury over the PlusD leak stemmed from fears of jeopardizing the safety of field operatives and active intelligence collection efforts and the leak's potential damage to diplomatic ties between nations. *Der Spiegel* wrote of the leak's potentially devastating significance: "Never before in history has a superpower lost control of such vast amounts of such sensitive information -- data that can help paint a picture of the foundation upon which U.S. foreign policy is built."[11] Needless to say, as an organization intent on exposing state secrets, Wikileaks has been at the center of much controversy since its inception. This controversy includes legal and criminal proceedings. The U.S. Justice Department is engaged in an ongoing criminal investigation into Wikileaks, an investigation that includes a grand jury exploration of Wikileaks and its founder Julian Assange under the Espionage Act.[12]

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[11] "The US Diplomatic Leaks: A Superpower's View of the World," *Spiegel Online*, November 28, 2010, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-us-diplomatic-leaks-a-superpower-s-view-of-the-world-a-731580.html.

[12] Ed Pilkington, "WikiLeaks: US Opens Grand Jury Hearing," *The Guardian*, May 11 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/may/11/us-opens-wikileaks-grand-jury-hearing.

4.2.2.2 Controversy and Significance: The Global Intelligence Files

At a minimum there are two steps required to successfully execute a leak. Firstly, the secret/classified/private information must be obtained. Secondly, the information must be made publicly available. In the case of the Global Intelligence Files, the leak was perpetrated in the winter of 2011 by hackers who claim to be part of the online activist group Anonymous. The contents of the leak; five million[13] internal emails of the private intelligence firm Stratfor sent between 2004 and 2011, were subsequently published by Wikileaks under the moniker "The Global Intelligence Files." Wikileaks began releasing the GI Files in February of 2012.[14] The selection used for this research study was released in spurts throughout 2012 and 2013.

Like most actions taken by Anonymous and Wikileaks the releases generated controversy. George Friedman, CEO of Stratfor, took to the Stratfor website in January 2011 to publicly address the hack. According to Friedman there were two breaches in December of 2011 that included theft of client credit card information, theft of internal emails, and the destruction of four Stratfor data servers and backup archives.[15] Friedman also used the public site to address the

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[13] Sarah Harrison, "The Global Intelligence Files," *Wikileaks,* accessed January 15, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html.

[14] "2012–13 Stratfor Email Leak," *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*, July 16, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2012%E2%80%9313_Stratfor_email_leak&oldid=671707116. and Sarah Harrison, "The Global Intelligence Files," *Wikileaks,* accessed January 15, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html.

[15] George Friedman, "The Hack on Stratfor," *Stratfor*, accessed March 20, 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/hack-stratfor.

conspiracy theories about Stratfor that surfaced (in part propagated by Wikileaks) as a result of the attack. "We are what we said we were," Friedman writes, "an organization that generates its revenues through geopolitical analysis. At the core of our business, we objectively acquire, organize, analyze and distribute information."[16] Because Stratfor is just one of several private intelligence firms, some speculate that it was specifically targeted by Wikileaks for its role in assisting the U.S. government in collecting information on Wikileaks itself for a large and ongoing trial. Nothing is known with certainty about the motives of the hackers claiming to be from the activist group Anonymous. On the day after the second Stratfor breach the *New York Times* reported that "the breach appears to have been conducted in retaliation for the arrest and imprisonment of Pfc. Bradley [now Chelsea] Manning,"[17] as well as to discredit the security and intelligence firm for being vulnerable to attack.

While Wikileaks asserts that the GI Files are "...a sinister catalog of surveillance [Stratfor] efforts," researcher Lisa Lynch found that news media predominantly used the GI Files to document what journalists saw as "the ineptitude of the well-connected private intelligence firm."[18] For example, journalist Pratap Chatterjee, who specializes in writing about what he calls the intelligence-industrial cartel, wrote for the *Guardian* that the true significance of

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Nicole Perlroth, "Hackers Breach the Web Site of Stratfor Global Intelligence," *The New York Times*, December 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/technology/hackers-breach-the-web-site-of-stratfor-global-intelligence.html.

[18] Lisa Lynch, "Wikileaks After Megaleaks," *Digital Journalism* 1, no. 3 (October 1, 2013): 314–34, doi:10.1080/21670811.2013.816544.

the Stratfor leak was the "...extremely low quality of the information available to the highest bidder."[19] Hal Berghel, academic and columnist for *Computer Magazine*, wrote on the first anniversary of the breach: "Firstly, I'm not convinced that Stratfor's approach to intelligence analytics will lead to significantly better decision making than we've come to expect from the military industrial complex … Secondly I'm bothered by the lack of oversight and transparency in the process."[20] Journalists have not historically used the collection in the manner Wikileaks perhaps intended when the organization published Stratfor's internal communications online, that is, to expose corrupt practices and questionable access to U.S. government agencies.

Despite public critique of Stratfor's analytical procedures[21] and concern over the nature of its access to government agencies and multinational corporations, there has been little to no dispute as to the veracity of the documents leaked. For the purpose of this project, the dataset will not be discounted for the controversy that surrounds it, nor judged by the quality of its analysis. CEO George Friedman's letter on Stratfor's website verified the leak. In the cloud of controversy surrounding the circumstances of the leak, the lack of debate about the veracity of these documents essentially confirms that this

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[19] "WikiLeaks' Stratfor Dump Lifts Lid on Intelligence-Industrial Complex," *The Guardian*, February 28, 2012, sec. US news, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/28/wikileaks-intelligence-industrial-complex.

[20] Hal Berghel, "Stratfor or Stratagainst." Computer Magazine, 2012.

[21] Max Fisher, "Stratfor Is a Joke and So Is Wikileaks for Taking It Seriously," *The Atlantic*, February 27, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/stratfor-is-a-joke-and-so-is-wikileaks-for-taking-it-seriously/253681/.

collection is authentic and unedited email communication among Stratfor employees.

This collection is useful because it documents uncensored content, sentiment and discourse about Russia's engagement in the Arctic as well as documenting the analytical process of employees at a large intelligence firm that is used widely by stakeholders in the U.S. government. The GI Files are of particular use for this research project because they are:

- Publicly-available internal conversations
  - Created for internal consumption, and
  - Written in uncouched, conversational language that includes discussion and opinion,
- Show "how the sausage is made;"
  - Demonstrate the process of intelligence collection,
  - Document the process of creating intelligence products,
- Text-based and
  - Can be attributed to individual intelligence analysts,
  - Document evolving discourse,
  - Contain metadata about dates and sender / receiver information.

The GI Files are valuable because they document private conversations that are part of the analytical process at Stratfor. As text-based digital data they lend themselves easily to analysis using data tools. The metadata attributed to the sender and receiver, and date stamping that is a part of all email communication provides an added layer of information for analysis.

4.2.2.3 Controversy and Significance: The Cablegate Collection

The Cablegate files are part of a 250,000-document leak perpetrated by Chelsea Manning. This data leaked by Manning in 2011 put Wikileaks at the forefront of the national debate about whistleblowing and state secrets. The military and the federal government hold that such activities are treasonous, and the world has witnessed the legal implications of such leaks. Pfc. Chelsea Manning is currently incarcerated and serving a 35-year sentence for leaking the Cablegate documents,[22] and Wikileaks founder Julian Assange has spent over three years hiding in the Ecuadorian embassy in London.

While one of the main criticisms of Manning's action was that the leak jeopardized U.S. government officials and agents worldwide, there has been little documented evidence of direct harm to a field operative or official as a result of the leak.[23] Manning stated in her arraignment "I only wanted to help people… I will serve my time knowing that sometimes you have to pay a heavy price to live in a free society."[24] While historically a leaker has acted to expose a specific issue about which the leaker has intimate and insider knowledge, in an age when data collection reaches epic proportions, leakers such as Manning are able to

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[22] Charlie Savage and Emmarie Huetteman, "Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal Leak of U.S. Files," *The New York Times*, August 21 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/manning-sentenced-for-leaking-government-secrets.html.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

execute "megaleaks" or "deluge leaks."[25] These deluge leaks differ from traditional leaks in that they are vast data caches with which the leaker has only an informal relationship. The relationship between leaker and leaked data may simply be that the leaker has access to the data, and no more. According to a *UC Davis Law Review* article written by Margaret Kwoka, the motives for Pfc. Manning, and other 'deluge leakers' likely are "a broad response to excessive government secrecy insofar as they reveal a vast array of records about which the leaker knows relatively little." Manning's arraignment statement, and the sheer volume of documents in her leak, support the commonly held belief that her motive was not to expose one singular government secret, but an overarching desire for government transparency. As with the Stratfor leak, there has been no documented controversy about the veracity of these cables in the PlusD Cablegate collection. The cables in this dataset are used on good faith that these are original, un-doctored communications between U.S. State Department officials, and thus they document authentic content, sentiment and discourse on the Russian Arctic.

[25] Margaret B. Kwoka, "Leaking and Legitimacy," *Social Science Research Network*, September 10, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2494375.

4.2.2.4 Distribution: Summary

Despite its controversial origins, this research project uses a dataset of 659 leaked intelligence emails and cables containing the words "Arctic" and "Russia." This data was leaked by Anonymous hackers and Pfc. Chelsea Manning to the government transparency organization Wikileaks, which published the materials on its website. Employees of the private intelligence firm Stratfor and U.S. State Department officials created these documents according to their own internal guidelines for intelligence collection and analysis. The dataset, used here on good faith that they are authentic copies of un-edited internal communication within both organizations, reveals the working processes and opinions of intelligence community members. The dataset will be analyzed using critical discourse analysis in three waves of effort to document discourse about the Russian Arctic in a comprehensive manner.

4.2.2 Production

A tenet of critical discourse analysis is that the means of production influence the product. Carefully documenting the decisions and influences that shape the process of intelligence gathering and synthesis leads to greater understanding of the resultant product: U.S. intelligence on Russian engagement in the Arctic. A systematic examination of Stratfor and State Department procedures of analysis, the process by which intelligence is produced, follows.

4.2.2.1 Production: Creating the Global Intelligence Files

The GI Files collection is predominantly open source intelligence, that is, intelligence culled from publicly available, non-classified, non-secret sources. Stratfor monitors and watch officers create open source intelligence [OSINT] by collecting news items related to political, economic, military, or other spheres that seem pertinent to ongoing developments or events or issues of interest. In an email about Stratfor's various teams, the OSINT team is described as being: "composed of the Watch Officers and Monitors, these are the technicians that vacuum up the world's vast amounts of open source intelligence, filter out the junk, and distribute the good stuff to the company. They're kind of like 49er's panning for gold."[26]

This daily process is the job of regional monitors, and is referred to internally by Stratfor as "normal sweeping" or "sweeps." The sweeps are a semi-formalized process for monitoring an identified list of news sources for regional or thematic areas of interest, and communicating highlights internally among Stratfor employees. The daily process aims to keep Stratfor employees abreast of all significant developments in a particular region or on a particular topic (i.e. Energy, Economy, Politics). These sweeps form the foundation for Stratfor intelligence analysis in this research project. The dataset demonstrates that these sweeps are dispersed throughout the company and are discussed by employees at all levels of the organization.

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[26] Michael Wilson, "Set - up Docs," *Wikileaks,* July 5, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/20/2042034_set-up-docs-.html.

The analytical depth of the sweeps varies, with the levels of intensity identified as "sweep tiers." At times of increased activity or political/client interest, the Stratfor sweeps can go into "heightened monitoring mode."[27] Stratfor outlines a systematic and daily process of "sweeping" an identified region to collect a general picture of all significant developments in all fields: political, economic, and security in both domestic and international arenas. Additionally, Stratfor sweeping instructions mention that "anomalous events" should be noted and documented.

The sweep process is guided by the above procedures and a prescribed list of news sources to be monitored. A 2011 email exchange between Former Soviet Union (FSU) monitor Izabella Sami and her replacement, in preparation for Sami's vacation, described the sweeping process as including Google searches and "searches of FSU sites."[28] The specific FSU sites are documented on Stratfor's internal wiki called Clearspace, to which this project does not have access, although the site listing was occasionally emailed and thus captured for study here. Sources for "quick sweep," "intermediary AOR sweeps," and "full sweeps" are broken out by country, and evolve over time (See Appendix B). The selection of these sources is a significant part of the production of the GI Files. The rules governing these sweeps, and the decision-makers who shape the process of these sweeps also influence the outcomes of Stratfor intelligence.

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[27] Marko Papic, "Europe Monitoring Sources," *Wikileaks,* accessed March 30, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/17/1724779_europe-monitoring-sources-.html.

[28] William Hobart, "Re: Russia Sweeps 11 October to 11 November," *Wikileaks,* October 4, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/21/2111542_re-russia-sweeps-11-october-to-11-november-.html.

Watch officer Michael Wilson sent the 2010 sweep list to monitors Izabella Sami and Klara Kiss Kingston.[29] On February 3rd, 2010 Wilson wrote to his colleagues, "Hi guys, Same deal as last time. Eugene[30] put this sweep together. Anything you guys can add would be much appreciated." The significance of this email is threefold. At Stratfor:

- analysts (like Eugene) create sweep source lists for their regions;
- monitors (like Izabella and Klara) are regularly asked for input on source lists;
- watch officers (like Michael) facilitate communication between analysts and monitors.

Subsequent email exchanges detail how the FSU source list must have gone through an iterative process involving at least Eugene if not also watch officer Michael and research director Kevin. Subsequently, the list would have been augmented and edited further by the inclusion of input from Izabella and Klara, as evidenced by the February email mentioned above.

Appendix B also shows how the source list changes over time. The far right column is the FSU source list distributed to Stratfor employees in 2011. Even a quick glance shows that the list of sources grew in every instance, with the exception of the "General Central Asia/Caucasus" portion of the source list,

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[29] Michael Wilson, "FSU Monitoring Sources Sweep Update," *Wikileaks,* February 3, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/65/656677_fsu-monitoring-sources-sweep-update-.html.

[30] Eugene Chausovsky, then Eurasia Analyst (current Stratfor Director of Europe and Former Soviet Union Analysis)

which in 2011 was broken out into specific countries of interest (Tajikistan & Kyrgyzstan).

These email conversations and source lists offer a glimpse at the process of creating daily intelligence through a semi-formalized sweeping process that relies on news media. Analysts, monitors, watch officers, and the research director identify these media sources. The information in these sweeps is distributed widely and daily, thus having far-reaching impacts.

This process details how individual monitors, while working within a framework of analysis, are self-directed and use their own discretion on a daily basis. Monitors are responsible for maintaining and updating the source list, identifying pertinent articles, and translating foreign-language articles using their own language skills (at times augmented by Google Translate). This creates many openings for individual decision-making. While monitors are guided by the source list, they ultimately determine which articles to highlight for the team. The team, including their superiors, can ask the monitor for more information or direct the monitor to pay particular attention to a specific developing event. The watch officers in charge of the monitors also may redirect the attention or focus of the monitors, according to their own intuition or according to directives from their superiors.

That being said, within a formalized process and a defined hierarchy, the monitors exercise significant discretion. They work remotely (often across a spread of time zones) and correspond with their colleagues and superiors via email. With intimate, daily knowledge of their area of responsibility (AOR) news

sources, monitors make changes to the source list and articles for distribution without alerting superiors. This practice is documented in several ways throughout the GI Files.

This process for creating sweeps, and the analysis based on this OSINT relies heavily on news media reporting, news media published in English, the translation skills of monitors, and decision-makers who shape the daily selection of disseminated articles, as well as those actors who shape the main source list. It is important to recognize this last influence on Stratfor products: actors such as editors and journalists publishing at news sources on Stratfor monitoring lists. Stratfor's internal procedures, as well as the procedures leading to news reports, thus shape the discourse of intelligence related to U.S. perceptions of Russia and the Arctic.

4.2.2.2 Key Actors

The table below breaks out the most frequent email sender in Stratfor's Global Intelligence (GI) files by year, and the most frequent email recipient. The purpose of this inquiry was to identify key actors within the dataset. For each year, the key actor was FSU monitor Izabella Sami. Please note that from 2004 - 2006 there is no communication containing "Russia" and "Arctic" from the Global Intelligence Files, a finding that will be explored in a later section of the thesis.

Table 4 Key Actors in the Global Intelligence Files documents

Year	# Stratfor	Most frequent sender	Most frequent recipient

	emails		
2004 - 2006	0 out of 793	/	/
2007	3 out of 793	n/a	analysts@stratfor.com
2008	11 out of 793	izabella.sami@stratfor.com	eurasia@stratfor.com, os@stratfor.com, countrybriefs@stratfor.com
2009	177 out of 793	izabella.sami@stratfor.com	os@stratfor.com
2010	155 out of 793	izabella.sami@stratfor.com	os@stratfor.com
2011	440 out of 793	izabella.sami@stratfor.com	os@stratfor.com
year unknown	7 out of 793	izabella.sami@stratfor.com	os@stratfor.com

Information culled from emails in the dataset contributes to the profile of Izabella Sami below.

4.2.2.2.1 Profiling Izabella Sami

Izabella Sami, Stratfor's Former Soviet Union (FSU) monitor seems to have joined Stratfor in May of 2008. This assumption is based on an email conversation between Lauren Goodrich, Senior Eurasia Analyst and Director of Analysis, and herself about setting up her email account in which Goodrich proclaims "You've been Stratfor-ized!"[31]

Sami reveals much about her personal life in her work emails, as many people do. In December of 2008 she was married to an American[32] working for the USAID Economic Growth Office in Kabul, [33] living alone in Skopje,[34] and had a grown daughter who was attending UC Berkeley and soon to be married.[35] In 2009 Sami mentions that she has a long work history in international organizations and embassies, including the OSCE and the Hague Tribunal. She also reveals that she is Macedonian, but not an ethnic Albanian.

Often, Sami is reserved and "no-nonsense" in her emails. She is deferential to her superiors, and at times, for instance, when asking for time off, she comes across as timid. In contrast to some other Stratfor employees (for

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[31] Lauren Goodrich, "Re: [Fwd: Email Info for Izabella Sami]," *Wikileaks*, May 1, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/55/5541346_re-fwd-email-info-for-izabella-sami-.html.

[32] Izabella Sami, "Re: Hey Izabella II ...," *Wikileaks,* 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/65/659842_re-hey-izabella-ii-.html

[33] Eugene Chausovsky, "Re: [Eurasia] Izabella Moving to Armenis Soon," *Wikileaks,* September 7, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/28/2878666_re-eurasia-izabella-moving-to-armenis-soon-.html.

[34] Lauren Goodrich, "Re: Happy Holidays," *Wikileaks,* December 22, 2008. http://wl.wikileaks-press.org/gifiles/docs/5412158_re-happy-holidays-.html.

[35] Ibid.

example Marko Papic or Mark Lanthemann) she is not frequently chatty or informal; however the tone of her emails is courteous and friendly. She seems to be well liked by her colleagues.

Emails suggest that she is respected by her superiors for her experience in international governmental organizations and in Macedonia, and valued for her command of multiple languages (Macedonian, Russian, English, and possibly Hungarian[36]). In one email she is asked about security procedures and the history of the OSCE mission in Macedonia, and she replies succinctly and with confidence.[37] In another email watch officer Chris Farnham writes "Izabella advises me that the news source is very reliable,"[38] indicating he perceives her as an authority. As referenced elsewhere in this research project, her input is sought and included in creating the source list for monitoring the FSU region. Conversation with Peter Zeihan,[39] Stratfor's former Vice President of Analysis, reflects her being respected as an authority despite her lower-level position within the organization.

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[36] Izabella Sami, "Re: Izabella - Please Read," *Wikileaks,* August 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/66/661603_re-izabella-please-read-.html.

[37] Marko Papic, "Re: [Eurasia] [CT] Embassy Staffer and His Translator Arrested in Germany," *Wikileaks,* March 2009, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/16/1672875_re-eurasia-ct-embassy-staffer-and-his-translator-arrested-in.html.

[38] Lauren Goodrich, "Re: G3/B3/GV* - RUSSIA/ITALY/LIBYA/ENERGY - Gazprom Could Comeback to Libya," *Wikileaks,* September 14, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/18/1830332_re-g3-b3-gv-russia-italy-libya-energy-gazprom-could-comeback.html.

[39] Marko Papic, "Re: [Eurasia] GREECE/MACEDONIA - Greece Backs 'Republic of Northern Macedonia,'" *Wikileaks,* April 2009, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/16/1675069_re-eurasia-greece-macedonia-greece-backs-republic-of.html.

Her interconnectedness to different aspects of international governance and security apparatus demonstrates the fluidity of her knowledge and its geographic breadth. During the time span of the dataset she lived in Skopje, Budapest, and Yerevan; and with a husband stationed in Afghanistan, a sick mother in Budapest and a daughter in California, she maintained close personal ties across the globe.

As an internationally experienced, multi-lingual monitor working remotely, Sami had the authority to operate with some degree of autonomy. In response to one of the few emails from a superior correcting her work performance, she writes: "I do need some guidance once in awhile."[40] Her statement indicates that she is often left to her own devices in her monitoring and translation of FSU news sites on the os@stratfor.com and eurasia@stratfor.com lists. This autonomy and respect reflect the trust and authority she enjoys to make analytical decisions. That is, she decides how to translate, what to share in her daily sweeps, based on her life experience as a career employee in international governmental organizations and as a well-travelled European speaking several languages. While only a small percent of the entire Global Intelligence files is analyzed in this research study, a quick search of Wikileaks' site reveals that "Izabella Sami" is mentioned (likely as sender) in 4,000+ of the 11,000+ emails found in the Global Intelligence Files containing the words Arctic and Russia. Her imprint upon this

[40] Izabella Sami, "Re: Izabella - Please Read," *Wikileaks,* August 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/66/661603_re-izabella-please-read-.html.

dataset, and the discourse surrounding Arctic and Russia emerging from Stratfor is indelible.

4.2.2.3 Production: Email Communication

Monitors such as Sami collect news items through this sweeping process and distribute them via email to individuals on internal Stratfor email lists. Stratfor has specific email lists for various types of information, and for different types of employees. Strafor gives email communication much weight; one internal document identifies email as "how we communicate as a company."[41] The email list selected by the sender is a type of tagging. The sender thereby identifies who needs to see this information, as well as its topic. Below is a table of the email lists used in this dataset, organized by year and frequency of use.

[41] Nathan Hughes, "Fwd: Email Guidance - Now in Effect," *Wikileaks,* April 30, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/35/3548126_fwd-email-guidance-now-in-effect-.html.

Table 5 Email lists by year and frequency of use

Email sent to List....	unknown	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	total
alerts@stratfor.com						1	***1***
allstratfor@stratfor.com				1		2	***3***
analysts@stratfor.com		2	4	1	1	1	***9***
aors@stratfor.com				1			***1***
briefers@stratfor.com						1	***1***
countrybriefs@stratfor.com			70	42			***112***
dialog-list@stratfor.com						41	***41***
econ@stratfor.com						1	***1***
eurasia@stratfor.com	2		5	99	45	32	***251***
gvalerts@stratfor.com				1			***1***
military@stratfor.com				1		1	***2***
os@stratfor.com	6	1	5	171	143	269	***761***
researchers@stratfor.com					1		***1***
translations@stratfor.com					1	89	***90***
watchofficer@stratfor.com			1		1	1	***3***
writers@stratfor.com						1	***1***
Total	**8**	**3**	**20**	**317**	**192**	**440**	**1279**[42]

The os@stratfor.com list for open source information is by far the most heavily used at 761 emails, and is consistently in use from 2008 to 2011. Email lists eurasia@stratfor.com and countrybriefs@stratfor.com for region and country-specific updates (respectively) are the next most frequently emailed with a

[42] Some emails are sent to more than one email list, hence the inflated total.

cumulative 363 emails. The fourth most popular email listing is translations@stratfor.com, a list for translations, as the working language of Stratfor is English. These four email lists received the bulk of the dataset's emails, capturing almost 95 percent of email traffic in the Stratfor dataset. The email list alerts@stratfor.com received only one email in this dataset that spans seven years. The alerts email list is identified in internal Stratfor documents as being for "high-level situational awareness,"[43] so it can be surmised that this dataset does not include high-level intelligence alerts. This analysis of distribution patterns signifies that at Stratfor, during the time period of 2004 - 2011, emails about Arctic Russia were seen as:

- Pertaining to the Eurasian region (eurasia@stratfor.com),
- Related to certain nation states (countrybriefs@stratfor.com) and not, for example thematic issues such as environmental, financial, or indigenous issues, etc.
- Open-source material (os@stratfor.com) as opposed to the high level intelligence sent to alerts@stratfor.com,
- Often items for translation, presumably from Russian to English (translations@stratfor.com). These items appear in the files as already completed English translations, and their original language is not a part of the dataset.

[43] Nathan Hughes, "Fwd: Email Guidance - Now in Effect," *Wikileaks,* April 30, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/35/3548126_fwd-email-guidance-now-in-effect-.html.

Emails were dated 2007 at the earliest, with the bulk of emails being sent from 2008 - 2011. This indicates that Stratfor was not actively collecting intelligence or performing sweeps on Arctic Russia from 2004 - 2006, and was not heavily invested in monitoring/communicating about Russia's engagement in the Arctic until 2009.

4.2.2.4 Production: Creating the Cablegate Collection

The Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy (PlusD) collection from Wikileaks includes over 250,000 predominantly confidential[44] cables created and used by the State Department. Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State, famously called the publication of these documents "'an attack on the international community… sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations,'"[45] and her words align generally with sentiment from other state officials and major news outlets. The 168 cables that included the key terms Russia and Arctic used here span from 2005 to 2010. This sub-section examines these 168 cables for revealing patterns emerging from sender and receiver, and for tagging and classification trends.

In the GI Files, Stratfor's communication revealed much about the internal process of creating analysis. The CableGate collection however is comprised of predominately completed analytical products. State Department employees send polished, vetted, final cables between posts. While these cables contain frank analysis that could embarrass the U.S. foreign diplomacy agency, they do not reveal as much of the iterative or dialogic creative process of analysis as the GI Files. Consequently, the production analysis that follows is slightly different than the analysis performed on the GI Files. The collections are sufficiently different to require different approaches.

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[44] Not all cables in the PlusD collection were classified, however even unclassified diplomatic exchange is not normally readily available, in a widely publicized searchable free archive.

[45] Micah L. Sifry and Andrew Rasiej, *WikiLeaks and the Age of Transparency,* (Counterpoint, 2011) 37.

State Department cables have a set of metadata associated with them. These include: cable title, sending date, sending post/agency and recipient post/agency, original and current classification, tags, and other. An example of the full metadata captured for each cable is shown below (Fig. 2), in a screenshot of one of the dataset's cables:

RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: POLICY AND COMPETING VOICES

Date:	2009 May 26, 11:41 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID:	09MOSCOW1346_a
Original Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Handling Restrictions	-- Not Assigned --	Character Count:	14298
Executive Order:	-- Not Assigned --	Locator:	TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:	ENRG - Economic Affairs--Energy and Power I PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs I PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations I RS - Russia I SENV - Social Affairs--Environment	Concepts:	-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:	-- Not Assigned --	Type:	TE
Office Origin:	-- N/A OR BLANK --	Archive Status:	-- Not Assigned --
Office Action:	-- N/A OR BLANK --		
From:	RUSSIA MOSCOW	Markings:	-- Not Assigned --
To:	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I GROUP DESTINATIONS EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE I JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF I NATO - EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATIVE I NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL I RHMFISS SACEUR POLAD SHAPE BE I RUCPDC NOAA I SECRETARY OF DEFENSE I SECRETARY OF STATE		

Figure 2 Cablegate Cable metadata as published on Wikileaks[46]

Two areas of the production process that are ripe for a meso-level analysis are the Cablegate collection's "Tag" and "Classification" categories. The following analyzes what tags and classifications reveal about content and areas of concern in the Cablegate collection. This meso-level analysis aims to reveal patterns and trends of State Department discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic.

[46] Amb. John Beyrle, "Russia And The Arctic: Policy And Competing Voices." Wikileaks, May 26, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MOSCOW1346_a.html.

4.2.2.4.1 Recipients of the Cablegate Collection

Cables were often sent to multiple agencies, offices, and diplomatic posts. The most frequent recipient in this collection of Cablegate was the office of the Secretary of State, with 145 of 168 cables received. Following the Secretary of State, the most frequent recipient was the office of the Secretary of Defense. This is expected, as these two recipients are top intelligence consumers. Authors Roger George and James Bruce of *Analyzing Intelligence* write: "the makers of foreign and defense policy -- primarily the Secretaries of State and Defense -- are key intelligence consumers with different intelligence needs reflecting their unique operational responsibilities."[47] It is not surprising that these two officials would receive the largest volume of these cables, however it is noteworthy, in this analysis of threat detection and trends towards securitization, that the Secretary of Defense was the second most frequent recipient. The Secretary of Defense received just 58 of the cables, far fewer than the Secretary of State.

[47] James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George, *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*. Second Edition. (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 29.



Figure 3 Top recipients of Cablegate collection (# of instances by Recipient)

The National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. embassy in Moscow comprise the remaining top five recipients of this collection. This indicates identification of security or defense matters of interest in this data. However, even combined, these four recipients did not surpass the Secretary of State as recipients of the cables in this dataset. Other defense or security branches of the U.S. government that received this collection of cables include: the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the U.S. European Command (US EUCOM). One possible explanation for the predominance of the CIA and the DIA as top ten recipients in this dataset is the post-9/11 trend towards interagency intelligence sharing. Authors of *Analyzing Intelligence* note that since the 2004 Intelligence

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) communication amongst the IC "has inevitably yielded greater transparency and collaboration, as well as an enhanced effort to define collaborative boundaries between DIA and CIA, the principle all-source analytic organizations with expertise in military analysis…"[48] In an era of interagency sharing these two agencies are tasked with ingesting all sources of intelligence. Nevertheless, they did not receive all of these cables.

Another interesting trend to note is that U.S. Army's Pacific Command (USPACOM), which has the mandate to operate out of the U.S. Arctic region, received this intelligence material only four times. U.S. Army's Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), which shares the U.S. Arctic domestic mandate with USPACOM, received the intelligence in only three instances. U.S. Army's European Command (USEUCOM) is listed as a recipient in seven instances. To provide some context for these figures, diplomatic posts in Afghanistan received twenty-one cables, posts in China and Hong Kong received seventeen cables, and collectively the Polynesian island nations of Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Palau received seven. In this data set the State Department is not communicating with Arctic-mandated army commands with any frequency on issues using the words "Russia" and the "Arctic."

In summary, the collection tends toward communication with political and embassy entities, and secondarily with security and defense entities. Domestic security and intelligence arms are widely represented as recipients of this

[48] Ibid, 107

intelligence, but also of note is the frequency of communication with international security/defense offices at NATO and the UN.

The prevalence of European embassy posts and European-focused international groups as recipients highlights a European emphasis in the dataset. This is noteworthy as the U.S., Canada, and Russia, none of which are classically categorized as "European" control the largest geographic portions of the Arctic region, and commands the wealth of combined operational capabilities in the Arctic. Thus the tendency to favor European recipients is an unexpected pattern that may indicate sentiment that the Arctic is a *European*, as opposed to a North American, or a Eurasian concern. Sixty-eight of the 151 cables contain the word "Europe" and a scan of these documents reveals they touch on a variety of topics.

A confidential cable from then U.S. Ambassador to Russia John R. Beyrle titled "DFM Grushko On Georgia, Energy Security, And European Security" mentions the Arctic only once. The document references failures of European security measures to include Russian participation. Writes Beyrle:

> As a result of the failures of the CFE, OSCE, as well as gaps in European security, including energy security, Grushko advocated for Medvedev's proposed EST (reftel), arguing that energy security, the Arctic, cyber-security, territorial integrity, the use of force, and instruments of arms control needed to be discussed in a more open and inclusive mechanism.[49]

Europe, security issues, and the Arctic are three areas in which the U.S. State Department seeks increased collaboration with Russia.

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[49] Amb. John Beyrle, "DFM Grushko On Georgia, Energy Security, And European Security." *Wikileaks*, February 13, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MOSCOW355_a.html.

Also surprising is the frequency with which Middle Eastern and Asian embassy posts were recipients of this intelligence. The documents reveal that the United States views Russia not only as a potential partner in the Arctic, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. This perception is documented in a 2009 secret cable written by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton titled "Ambassador Volker's meeting with Russian Ambassador."[50] In the effort to engage Russia as an ally and partner of the United States, Clinton writes that "Amb. Volker's meeting gives us an opportunity to reiterate that the Obama Administration is interested in strengthening cooperation with Russia, in particular in areas of joint concern, e.g., Afghanistan, counterterrorism, counter proliferation."[51] The document references plans to re-activate a NATO-Russia dialogue and to expand conversations with regard to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), as well as briefly mentioning the Arctic. The aspirations captured in this document are collaborative and extend to the Arctic:

> Secretary Clinton recently pledged that the Administration will prove "very receptive" to dialogue on the High North; Arctic issues, which 'dramatically affect' our own interests, also offer the opportunity for 'positive action' and to 'deepen our partnerships.'[52]

The operative word to describe the quotation above is "opportunity," indicating that the Arctic is seen as a safe area for effective U.S. collaboration with the Russian state. Note here that this is one of sixteen secret cables. Even while

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[50] Sec. of State Hillary Clinton, "Amb Volker's Meeting With Russian Ambassador," *Wikileaks*, January 30, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE8311_a.html.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

discussing sensitive issues such as counter proliferation and America's ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the cable maintains a mostly positive tone.

4.2.2.4.2 Tagging in the Cablegate Collection

The tags attached to these same cables allow for a better understanding of the subject matter. The graph below (Fig. 4) groups all the tags applied by State Department officials by category: Political Affair, Military Affair, Environmental Affair, Regional Affair, etc. These tagging categories are taken directly from the State Department with the exception of the categories "State," "IGO," "Region," and "Flu Activities." The tag category "State" groups all specifically mentioned nation states, the "IGO" category groups international governing bodies such as UN and NATO, the "Region" category groups all tags pertaining to a regional area (with the exception of the Arctic Region which is kept separately), and the "Flu Activities" category groups all tags pertaining to flu epidemics.



Figure 4 Tags in the Cablegate Collection

The largest tag category is “Political Affairs,” followed by “State,” a tag I created for all specifically mentioned nation states. The State Department tag for “Economic Affairs” is the third largest category, followed by much fewer instances of State Department tags for the “Environment” and “Military Affairs.” As with the recipient analysis above, political affairs are the most commonly used tag category. While military matters take a spot in the top five most common tags

and recipients and, while security and defense concerns are represented whether sorting by recipient (discussed previously) or by tag, these categories appear far less frequently than diplomatic and foreign policy recipients and tags. This pattern reveals a tendency of State Department staff to categorize the documents in this discourse as political over military concerns, which indicates that State Department sources captured here do not securitize Russian engagement in the Arctic. A securitized discourse would more heavily incorporate defense and intelligence actors, and in so doing would lend itself more to tagging that identifies the discourse as a military affair. This tagging practice would be a by-product of the way that securitized discourses are a break from politics as usual, and engage military and defense actors more fully in resolving or addressing the ensuing securitized discourse.

4.2.2.4.3 Classification in the Cablegate Collection

Another significant data point from the Cablegate Collection is the Classification tag. Executive Order 13526 on "Classified National Security Information" prescribes a systematic process across all federal agencies for classifying information. National defense historically "has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign nations."[53] The State Department collection of cables contains all levels of

[53] "Executive Order 13526 - Classified National Security Information," *Whitehouse.gov*, December 29, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information.

classification with the exception of the "top secret" classification. They include documents with unclassified, confidential, and secret classifications, and the modifier of "No Forn." "Unclassified" is not technically a classification, and unclassified documents can legally be released to anybody regardless of their security clearance. As outlined in the 2005 Department of State Classification guide, the confidential classification applies to information that "reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe." [54] In the case of this dataset, the State Department is the original classification authority, as it created and first distributed these cables. Secret classification is applied to information that "reasonably could be expected to cause *serious* damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe."[55] The qualifier "No Forn" is given to information that is not for release to foreign nationals, or is "information that should not be disseminated to locally engaged staff."[56] Top Secret materials were not distributed on SIPRNET, and thus are not a part of the Cablegate Collection.

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[54] "Department Of State Classification Guide (DSCG 05-01)," Department of State, January 2005, https://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dos-class.pdf.

[55] Ibid.

[56] "Guidance For Drafting SBU Telegram," Department of State, October 1, 1995, http://fas.org/sgp/news/2000/02/sbu.html. (emphasis added)



Figure 5 Classifications in the Cablegate Collection

The pie chart above (Fig. 5) breaks out the classification types applied to this dataset's cables. About half of the collection is classified "Confidential," with a small portion of that being "Confidential - No Forn." Almost 40 percent of the dataset is "Unclassified" or "Unclassified for official use only." Just 10 percent of the dataset is classified "Secret."

As the documents analyzed here contain 100 percent of the cables mentioning both the Arctic and Russia in the entire 250,000 Cablegate collection, these patterns of classification indicate that the conversations about the Arctic and Arctic Russia during this time were relatively few and a small percentage contained information that was seen to pose a major risk to national security.

When analyzing classification patterns, it should be noted that some former State Department employees have critiqued the formulaic nature[57] of categorization at the State Department. State Department officials reportedly use templates for cables with pre-designated classifications. This could lead to over-classification or incorrect application of classification according to the guidelines cited above.

Secondly, some argue that the risk-averse federal government over-classifies items to the point of diluting the significance of classification. Fears about accidentally releasing sensitive information may result in material receiving a higher classification than necessary. That being said, Executive Order 13526 specifically outlines that "if there is significant doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be classified at the lower level."[58] The classification patterns noted here may be the result of a formulaic approach to classification, a risk-averse approach to classification, or a "rounded-down" approach to classification. This is a level of analysis that is not within the scope of this project, but is worth noting. As this data-set is viewed as a discourse whose power exists in the eyes of its intended recipients, namely government employees with appropriate security clearances, then this discourse should be evaluated as it will be read by its intended recipients. When viewed as a whole these cables display a low level

[57] Interesting reading from The Nation on the arbitrary and formulaic nature of classification practices at the State Department.

[58] "Executive Order 13526 - Classified National Security Information," *Whitehouse.gov*, December 29, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information.

of threat to national security detected by its creators, and these perceptions would be received and duly noted by their designated recipients.

However, seventeen cables in this dataset are classified as secret. These cables primarily address higher-level meetings involving ambassador visits with Russian or Norwegian officials and preparations for NATO meetings and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) meetings. In most of these documents the Arctic is treated as an arena for potential cooperation, or potential conflict, with Russia. These secret cables document pragmatic and diplomatic approaches between Western powers and Russia to cooperate on oil spill response, on Arctic marine environmental protection, and through international treaties and the Arctic Council. Areas of conflict include Russia's increased military activity in the Arctic, Russia's improper adherence to the START Treaty in providing notice of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tests, internal NATO debate between different countries about the realities of a "Russian intelligence threat to NATO interests including energy security, in the Arctic," Russian misinformation practices designed to assert its Arctic sovereignty claims,[59] fears Russia "will set the Arctic agenda,"[60] and discord surrounding the role of NATO in the Arctic.

One secret cable titled "EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials" captures NATO's Minister of Defense Deputy Director of Security Policy Jan Olsen's comments on the role of Russia in

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[59] Amb. Benson Whitney, "Norway: Russian Presence In Svalbard Waters," *Wikileaks,* July 16 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OSLO398_a.html.

[60] CDA James T. Heg, "Norway's 2010 Defense Budget: High North And International Engagements," *Wikileaks,* October, 15 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09OSLO635_a.html.

the Arctic. U.S. Ambassador to Norway Barry White sent this cable to recipients including the DIA, Joint Analysis Center Molesworth (UK-based military intelligence analysis center for USEUCOM), NATO - European Union Cooperative, Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. The 2010 cable reports,

> On Russia Olsen described a growing "convergence of Russian rhetoric and military capability" which had the potential for creating a "more interesting" situation with Russia as it pursues its ambitions in the Arctic High North. MFA Russia Expert Anne Kjersti Karlsen contrasted Russia's continuing flights along Norway's coastline and portrayal of NATO as Russia's worst enemy with her judgment that Russia's true security focus was on China. Klovstad cautioned against extensive NATO involvement in Arctic issues saying the GoN wanted to avoid an escalation of tensions but noted Norway's desire for NATO to monitor the situation.[61]

The cable goes on to explore the future possible response within NATO and other Arctic states (Iceland, Sweden, and Finland), saying:

> Klovstad said that the GoN would like NATO to follow and be aware of developments in the Arctic High North in a way that would avoid provoking the Russians into tit-for-tat responses and escalation. For example, NATO could play a role in exercises for search and rescue capabilities, including through the NATO-Russia Council. She brought up the "Stoltenberg process," which calls for enhanced security cooperation with Iceland, Sweden and Finland while respecting each country's differing relationship with NATO.

Ambassador Klovstad is seen here to be signaling alarm on behalf of the government of Norway, while also suggesting a diplomatic approach. The U.S. Ambassador White forwards this communication on to other U.S. government officials without voicing U.S.-based alarm or offering a U.S. approach.

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[61] "EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials." *Wikileaks*, January 26 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OSLO45_a.html.

A cable addressing the 2006 closure of the U.S. naval base in Keflavik, Iceland titled "Icelandic Defense Policy one Year after United States Withdrawal," notes that Russia's interest in the Arctic regions relates to greater accessibility due to climate change. This cable sent from then U.S. Ambassador to Iceland Carol van Voorst advises the United States to urge Icelandic powers to expand security in advance of these future developments, including partnership with NATO. Ambassador van Voorst's cable closes by stating "We also want to quietly but strongly support efforts to improve the quality of the national discussion on defense and security affairs … These steps will help ensure that we and the Icelanders will be in sync as the security environment in the High North evolves."[62] Conversations about future Arctic security concerns cast Russia as a potential threat; however, the role of the U.S. remains to advise and encourage European partners to address Russian engagement in the Arctic and, as a last resort, to expand collaboration with NATO.

The secret cables examined here, while relaying information that may summarize conversations that took place between very exclusive groups, do not reveal any information that is not also available in news media or other open source channels. More so, these secret documents correlate the discourse that is taking place within the larger data set. Most of the discourse about the Arctic and Russia occurring during this timeframe at the State Department was not secret, nor was it even classified material. It is possible that Top Secret communications

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[62] Amb. Carol van Voorst, "Icelandic Defense Policy One Year After U.S. Withdrawal," *Wikileaks*, November 9 2007, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07REYKJAVIK322_a.html.

not available for this research project dominated the conversation within the State Department about the Arctic and Russia, but U.S. public policy does not suggest a separate substantially different top secret discourse based on perceptions of a serious threat posed by Russian engagement in the Arctic.

In summary, the Cablegate collection tags do not indicate that the State Department or Stratfor have securitized the discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic. These documents are more likely to be tagged by the creators as political and state affairs than military, defense, or security affairs. These documents are predominantly unclassified and confidential documents that State Department officials tag in terms that suggest non-securitization. While security and defense concerns arise in the conversation about Russia and the Arctic, these concerns are less prevalent than other concerns. If viewed as one large discussion, the nature of the conversation has a wider, geopolitical focus rather than an Arctic-specific focus. The XC (Arctic Ocean Region) tag appears only three times in this dataset. Detailed examination of seventeen secret documents confirms the complicated role of NATO in Arctic affairs, documents regional concerns of Russia's behavior in the Arctic, and witnesses U.S. positioning to support European forces to address potential conflict with Russia in the arena of the Arctic.

4.2.2.5 Production: Summary

The meso-level of analysis revealed much about Stratfor and the State Department's assessments of Russian engagement in the Arctic. Most notably, OSINT sweeps and unclassified or low-level classified content dominates this dataset. This pattern across both data sources supports my hypothesis of a non-securitized discourse on Russian engagement in the Arctic.

The meso-level of analysis uncovered two key sets of actors influencing the intelligence process that produced the Global Intelligence Files. These influencers include monitors (lower-tiered Stratfor employees) with substantial autonomy to filter and select the types of information received by private intelligence analysts on a daily basis. Another influencing group that lies beyond the scope of this project is the news media. Reporters and editors at news agencies who provide the fodder for these daily sweeps inform analytical products consumed internally at Stratfor, and externally by Stratfor clients including U.S. government employees and officials. Editorial selections of newsworthy items and their interpretation of events significantly impact the discourse generated by OSINT processes. The role of news media in the Stratfor OSINT process will be revisited in content analysis performed within the micro-level analysis.

4.2.3 Summary of the Meso-Level of Analysis

In March 2015, the Director of the Pentagon's National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) Robert Cardillo corroborated the patterns detected in this meso-level of analysis. Cardillo told DefenseOne, an online news source focused on U.S. defense and security, "a great deal of what's known about the Arctic is unclassified. We don't have a rich history of classified intelligence collection in the Arctic, because — guess what? — it wasn't a priority."[63] This statement affirms this thesis' meso-level analysis as well as its central finding. The Arctic has not been high on the list of military, political, or intelligence priorities for some time. The perceived lack of Russian capacity in the Arctic has partially informed this position. If the U.S. felt real risk to its national security interests emanating from Russia's engagement in the Arctic, in the way that for example, Finland has, it may have responded quite differently. Securitization of Russian behavior in the Arctic would have resulted in different U.S. Arctic strategy and policy efforts.

The assessment of Russia's incapacity relied on perceived military, economic and political insufficiencies of the Russian Federation. U.S. actors have viewed Russian military and naval capacity as aging and underfunded when compared with United States and allied resources. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Senior VP for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic Heather Conley expressed this perception recently in an interview with the

[63] Aliya Sternstein, "The Pentagon's Satellite Spies Are Aiming for the Arctic," *Defense One*, March 9, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/03/pentagons-satellite-spies-are-aiming-arctic/107076/.

Washington Post: "For many years, we kind of discounted Russia's conventional military."[64] Her comments, captured in April 2015, highlight a shift in perception of Russia in the Arctic. U.S. actors have also questioned the Russian Federation's political capacity. In a widely circulated internal email, Stratfor's then Vice President of Analysis Peter Zeihan presented a profile of a politically weak Russian president Vladimir Putin. This email is available on Wikileaks; however, it is not technically a part of this dataset as it does not directly reference the Arctic. The 2007 email discusses human-sourced intelligence (HUMINT). Stratfor CEO George Friedman wrote: "The important intel here is that putin (sic) is weaker than he looks."[65] Zeihan responded to the email chain, "Putin is the arbiter -- but we've ALWAYS (sic) said that he does not have the power to dictate events." The email reveals that Stratfor sees Russian energy behemoths Gazprom and Rosneft as significantly more powerful and potentially threatening than President Putin, and this sentiment is corroborated by the email's original human source. Political might in the Russian Federation during this time was seen to rest in the hands of the oligarchs - leaders of oil and gas extraction and other industries. These assessments corroborate the patterns and trends detected in this research project's meso-level of analysis and provide insight into the reason for this discursive stance.

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[64] Michael E. Miller, "Arctic 'chill' as Russia Reverts to Cold War Air and Sea Confrontations," *The Washington Post*, April 17, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/17/arctic-chill-as-russia-reverts-to-cold-war-air-and-sea-confrontations/.

[65] Peter Zeihan, "RE: HUMINT - RUSSIA - WHOAA... BP's Browne/the Inner Circle/the Monopolies," *Wikileaks*, May 02 2007, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/54/5481227_re-humint-russia-whoaa-bp-s-browne-the-inner-circle-the.html.

4.3 Micro-Level Analysis

While the meso-level of analysis aimed to glean insight from this discourse on Russia and the Arctic from patterns and trends in production and distribution of the dataset, the micro-level of analysis is interested in patterns in the *content*. This micro-analysis delves into the actual text of the dataset. Content of interest includes location entities, keyword entities, general concepts, and document sentiment. Sentiment analysis will reveal patterns in opinion and emotional leaning in the intelligence discourse on Russian engagement in the Arctic.

In the micro-level of analysis the entire text of all emails (the "body") and cables is analyzed in one group. Sender information, recipient information, and titles of emails and cables that were examined in the meso-level of analysis are ignored in this phase of analysis. First a sentiment analysis tool called Aylien analyzes the body text using natural language processing (NLP) to determine document-level sentiment: positive, negative, and neutral. I analyze the breakdown of sentiment in the entire dataset and note differences in sentiment patterns between the two data sources: the GI Files and Cablegate Collection. The programs compare content trends in the positive sentiment class with content patterns in the negative sentiment class. While more nuanced sentiment analysis may be required to extract deeper meaning, this process did not indicate a securitized stance in the data.

Next, I incorporate data analysis of all text in the dataset. This step in the micro-level of analysis examines content using data analysis and visualization tools that detect relationships between words. These software programs

incorporate mathematical and numerical processes such as betweenness centrality and term frequency to inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) that determine relationships and relevance in texts. I examined all Secret cables from the Cablegate collection, as this sub-section has a high likelihood of containing securitized dialogue. Then, the program analyzed all items in the dataset for patterns in word relationships. Lastly, using an extraction tool and mapping software I integrated all mentions of geographic location in a map for geographic content analysis. The resultant map reveals the international scope of the dataset, with location entities falling most densely in Western Europe.

Ultimately, the micro-level of analysis reveals a tendency of this dataset towards discussions of international cooperation on political and economic issues in the Arctic. Non-U.S. parties cite Russian engagement in the Arctic as troubling several times. However, U.S. government actors make little or no direct comment on the issue. The U.S. position seems to break into two main categories. The U.S. response to European fears of Russian engagement in the Arctic often comes across as a diplomatic "not our problem"; for example, in response to concerns of the members of the Icelandic government regarding the 2006 closing of the U.S. Keflavik Naval Air station. Alternatively, the United States views the Arctic as an area ripe for cooperation with Russian powers. Instances from the text reveal that diplomatic attempts to engage Russia often show U.S. actors using the relative low-stakes Arctic region as a region for engaging Russia in a positive way.

Content reveals patterns of interest in Russian federal-level politics, European politics, the role of Arctic Council states, hydrocarbon development, and legal issues. Analysis of location entities demonstrates not only an interconnected approach to Arctic, but also an absence of specific "Arcticness." Texts reveal a preference for internationalism in the Arctic, with frequent references to Western European and Afghani locations. Lending support to trends detected elsewhere, this analysis reveals repeated instances of intelligence viewing and discussing the Arctic in the language of international governance, with Arctic Council member and observer states frequently mentioned, and geopolitics (with frequent mentions of Afghanistan as a high point of U.S.-Russian relations). Other geographic entities are energy-producing nation states and energy transit states (nations with pipelines), leading me to conclude that the intelligence interest in the Arctic revolves around hydrocarbon extraction.

No detected patterns or trends counter this project's research hypothesis that U.S. intelligence has not securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic. Mentions of security and defense issues comprise a significant portion of this dataset, and there are many mentions of military and naval capacity, security groups such as NATO, and discussions of nuclear capacity and submarine fleets. Legal and criminal matters also arise in this dataset, in particular issues such as organized crime, maritime piracy and trafficking in persons. Yet several analysis tools reveal a greater trend in this discourse towards economic and political issues.

4.3.1 Sentiment Analysis

To begin the multi-step micro-analysis I ran the text through a sentiment analysis tool. Sentiment analysis (SA) uses text-mining procedures based on natural language processing (NLP) and computational linguistics. Developed for applications in fields such as marketing, consumer outreach and reputation management, SA aims to pinpoint the attitude of the document's author or speaker. Sentiment analysis contributes to this project by limiting researcher bias as it systematically detects sentiment. This objectivity and consistency provided greater value in the research process than the comparatively superior nuanced emotive skill of a human analyst. In short, this research favors the consistency and speed of the sentiment analysis over the more nuanced sentiment analysis possible with a human analyst. While SA tools are emerging that can detect specific emotional categories (happy, sad, angry, etc) such a tool was not utilized here because the focus was on getting a general level of sentiment. Additionally, these more nuanced emotive tools are still in very developmental phases and not readily accessible to masters-level researchers. Sentiment analysis at the document level is useful because it allows the researcher to contextualize sentiment trends within a large collection of documents.

Given what is known about the institutions that created the two data sources, they may systematically demonstrate different types of sentiment. For example, the documents in the Cablegate collection are official U.S. State

Department cables and therefore may be written in a "diplomatic" tone that is systematically neutral or positive in sentiment. Alternately, these internal documents between State Department colleagues may tend to be more negative in sentiment, as their frank expressions about real-world concerns may be more spontaneous than communications produced for public consumption. GI Files emails from the private intelligence firm Stratfor may include more emotive language (leaning either positive or negative) as the private intelligence firm may not pressure employees to use formal or official language in email communiqués. However, the GI Files are known from the meso-level of analysis to be mostly open source intelligence. OSINT consists of collections of news articles, often from a variety of sources. Detected sentiment may stem from the news article's author, or may come across as neutral, because of the variety of sources in one email.

This sentiment analysis will reveal the tone of the discourse. It is highly implausible that a securitized discourse would use language that was consistently positive in sentiment. Yet given the way that human beings use language to communicate sentiments, patterns of negative and positive sentiment likely arise in both securitized and non-securitized discourse. What follows are the findings of sentiment analysis of the dataset.



Figure 6 Sentiment of Entire Dataset

The sentiment analysis tool Aylien found that 232 documents exhibit positive sentiment and 187 documents exhibit negative sentiment. According to this SA tool, 243 documents are neutral in sentiment. This does not mean that there are no instances of mixed sentiment exhibited in portions of these documents; however, this SA tool examines sentiment polarity at the *document* level and categorizes the document according to the predominant sentiment. As a preliminary observation the dataset as a whole is not overwhelmingly negative, and is almost equally likely to be positive or neutral in sentiment.

The next step was to look for any noticeable difference in sentiment trends between the dataset's two sources: Stratfor's internal emails and the U.S. State Department's cables. This step will illuminate sources of difference or similarity, and help to attribute trends. For example, if all the negative sentiment documents

are found to originate from one source that should be accounted for in the final analysis.

When sentiment class is broken out across the two data sources, the U.S. State Department's Cablegate Collection is more emotive overall. The Cablegate Collection has higher percentages of negative and positive sentiment. The GI Files from Stratfor have a significantly higher percentage (almost 40 percent) of neutral sentiment evincing documents.



Figure 7 Sentiment across data sources



Figure 8 Sentiment across data sources

One would hypothesize that a securitized issue would use language that reflects negative sentiment. The documents would communicate these sentiments through words like threat, risk, worry, and fear. The sentiment of this dataset does not appear, based on these software programs' findings, to be overwhelmingly negative. The dataset is almost split in thirds, with slightly more neutral than positive sentiment documents, and slightly more positive than negative sentiment documents.

Neutral-sentiment evincing documents appear for a variety of different reasons. In general, it appears that neutral sentiment documents are either comprised of several articles from multiple news sources or are written in a "fact-based" reporting style. Many of the neutral sentiment documents retell details of financial and business events, which are predominantly "fact-based reports" including details on sale or share prices and lists of business names. This fact-based tone appears in documents about non-business topics as well, and this writing style is often intentionally neutral in tone. Another subset of the neutral sentiment documents contains a collection of news articles on the day's events in Russia. The news articles' differing editorial stances could prompt the program to assign the document a statistically-neutral sentiment polarity number, despite the document actually containing positive and negative sentiment portions. Content analysis on the sentiment breakdowns of these documents did not reveal substantive differences in content between the positively sentimented documents and the negatively sentimented documents. Content analysis did, however, indicate that the Russian state-owned media inject news articles with both

positive and negative sentiment. This phenomenon deserves further, dedicated research that is beyond the scope of this project.

Taking into consideration the neutral sentiment tone that comes from the multi-voiced nature of these documents and the relatively equal division of positive, negative and neutral sentiment-documents, the sentiment analysis is inconclusive. The analysis tool would require more specificity to make a clear statement about the role of sentiment in U.S. intelligence about the Russian Arctic. In regards to this project's prediction of a non-securitized stance, the sentiment analysis did not counter this claim; however, with 29 percent of the documents detected as being negative in sentiment, it is unclear what conclusions can be safely deduced. More investigation into the role of sentiment in this the dataset in general is required.

4.3.2 Content Analysis

In the next step of the micro-analysis, I employed content analysis software to examine documents for patterns in content. This step in the micro-analysis process aims to detect large-scale word patterns. To do so, I used two data analysis and visualization programs to visualize networks of words, frequency of use, and other types of word and document relationships in the content of these two data sources.

Overview is a content analysis program created by the Knight Foundation to assist journalists with analyzing large text-based datasets like this one.

Overview uses text-mining and NLP to analyze documents for word frequency and document uniqueness with an algorithm called TF-IDF (text frequency, inverse document frequency). *Overview* groups and orders documents by similarity. It arranges these document groups in a tree form (like a file tree or family tree), with the largest grouping including all documents. In addition to clustering the documents together, *Overview* also identifies the most common and most significant words in each document group. The document tree is organized in increasingly smaller word groups. I also determined some key words of specific pertinence to this dataset.

I directed *Overview* to weigh 400+ words[66] more heavily in its algorithmic processing. These words pertain to the research project and are positive or negative sentiment words (i.e. protested, concern, risk, threat for negative sentiment terms and confidence, support, and collaborate for positive sentiment terms), names of Arctic nations or actors (i.e. indigenous, Danish, Sweden), words common to Arctic political issues (i.e. ice, limit, shelf, agreement, climate change) and security / defense words (i.e. nuclear, danger, spill, criminal, victim, aggression). The most common words for each group are identified in the heading of the group. Below is the document tree *Overview* created of the dataset. The document tree identifies important words and then groups the documents by content similarity.

[66] See Appendix A



Figure 9 Screen shot of content analysis in the Overview document tree

Overview detected the following thematic patterns in the dataset:

1. Russian energy companies (keywords: oil and gas, pipeline, Gazprom, Rosneft)
2. Russian political actors and groups (keywords: Putin, Medvedev)

3. International energy resource companies operating in the Russian Arctic (keywords: BP, ExxonMobil)
4. Russian offshore oil and gas sites (keywords: Prirazlomnoye, Pechora, shelf, offshore)
5. Crime and emergencies
6. Transportation of energy resources (keywords: NSR, Novatek, Kola Peninsula, transport)
7. Political bodies, such as the Arctic Council, Arctic states, Norwegian and Swedish political and security actors (keywords: Greenland, Denmark, and Norway)
8. Law, legal conflicts, and infringements (keywords: accident, victim, law, resource, shelf)
9. Military and navy capabilities of Russia, Canada and Norway
10. Shipping, research, and nuclear waste

These indicators of significant and key content (please note that "significance" is mathematically different than "frequency") demonstrate that this dataset, this discourse, is mainly about the topics listed above. This dataset documents interest within the U.S. intelligence community in topics such as the Russian energy industry, Arctic shipping, Arctic states, legal issues and criminal concerns, naval capacity, and research. The largest content group is a set of documents that refer to key Russian political figures of the time Vladimir Putin and Dimitry

Medvedev, oil and gas related items, and major Arctic legal issues such as continental shelf limitations.

Interestingly, the key terms identified fail to reflect the role of Russian domestic political powers such as regional and city powers in Arctic energy politics. Key Russian political figures identified include President / Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev, President / Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Ambassador to the United States Dimitry Rogozin, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. This recurrent mention of national, rather than regional political actors may stem from a lack of policy power vested in sub-national actors, or from a lack of interest or capacity in the U.S. intelligence collection processes. It is beyond the scope of this project to examine this absence of reference to local and regional actors further.

4.3.2.1 Content Analysis of the Role of the Arctic Council

Overview highlights the key role that the Arctic Council plays in this discourse. Forty documents in the dataset specifically mention the Arctic Council. Delving into the text itself sheds light on this content trend. Words of Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Political Director Ulrik V. Knudsen capture two opinions on the topic. One State Department cable states that *[emphasis added]*: "Knudsen *agreed* that the Arctic should not become militarized and took on board the *United States desire* to keep the Arctic Council at the center of discussions

about the region."[67] This statement clearly documents the United States "desire" for a de-militarized Arctic and strong Arctic Council.

This dataset captures the debate that took place during the timespan of these documents (2004 - 2011), regarding the exact role of the Arctic Council. Line-by-line readings of the text demonstrate that speakers captured in these documents are engaged in active debate about issues such as:

- The extent and nature of the Arctic Council's role[68] in the geopolitics of the Arctic,
- Which entities and states should be allowed to participate in the Arctic Council including debate over the significance of the Arctic 5[69] (littoral states) and concern over non-Arctic states gaining control in the region.
- NATO's potential role in the Arctic Council[70]
- The EU's potential role in the Arctic Council

The debate centers around the extent to which the Arctic Council, NATO, and the EU have political and security mandates in the Arctic. The dataset documents concern from European parties about a lagging U.S. mandate in the Arctic, however, there is little commentary on this matter originating from within the United States. Most documents show U.S. actors reporting about the U.S. federal

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[67] Amb. Laurie S. Fulton, "EUR DAS Quanrud's February 10-11 Visit: Foreign Affairs, Defense And Social Policy Issues," *Wikileaks*, February 22, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10COPENHAGEN103_a.html.

[68] Amb. James P. Cain, "Deputy Secretary's Meeting With Norwegian FM Stoere In Greenland," *Wikileaks,* June 6 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08COPENHAGEN323_a.html.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Lauren Goodrich, "Arctic AOR - Russia's Arctic 'Sea Grab,'" *Wikileaks,* August 15, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/54/5424004_arctic-aor-russia-s-arctic-sea-grab-.html.

government's mandate to maintain good relations and coordinate activities with Russian actors and engage them politically. This stance corresponds with the Arctic Council's mandate, which clearly and pointedly avoids security discussion. That being said, the dataset documents interest on the part of non-U.S, actors in identifying an appropriate intergovernmental forum for addressing security concerns in the Arctic.[71] The U.S. stance also seems to suggest, at least in this dataset and in this time period, an expectation that smaller Arctic states take responsibility for the security of their own Arctic regions.

In summary, the dataset contains forty documents that mention the Arctic Council. This number of references shows strong interest in the Arctic Council. One note (referenced above) explicitly cites the U.S. preference that international relations be conducted through the intergovernmental forum. There is no clear evidence within these references to the Arctic Council that U.S. actors are overly concerned with threats to national security originating within the Arctic region, or in relation to Arctic issues. In regard to Arctic Council references, no evidence suggests that U.S. intelligence has securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic. In fact, as the Arctic Council has no security mandate, by preferring the Arctic Council as the forum for international relations in the Arctic, the United States ostensibly asserts a de-securitized diplomatic arena in the Arctic.

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[71] Amb. Kurt Volker, "Rogozin Rambles Soviet-Style In Restart Of The NATO-Russia Council," *Wikileaks, May 4* 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USNATO165_a.html.

4.3.2.2 Visualizing Word Networks

Primarily the *Overview* program groups and analyzes documents by content. *Overview* uncovers major content patterns in documents, and helps the researcher to identify key content patterns in each document. Examples of the key contents *Overview* detected within documents in the dataset are: energy, political, military, social/cultural, and criminal. The next analysis tool, *Textexture*, maps word relationships as a network. Word relationships include factors such as word frequency, word centrality (how central is the idea to the text as a whole), and word co-occurrence (words that appear frequently together). While *Overview* sheds light on key concepts in *documents*, this next step in the analytical process will detect major word relationships by viewing the entire corpus as one *massive text*. This approach aligns nicely with the theoretical approach of this paper to view the dataset as documenting a discourse. Word relationship network graphs provide another layer of insight into this intelligence discourse about Arctic and Russian issues.

To discover word relationships, I employed the help of *Textexture*, a program created by a text analytics firm, Nodus Labs, and specifically designed to analyze word relationships in a text using network graphs. Using mathematical and statistical processes the visualization program first identifies keywords in the text. Then, it calculates relationships between keywords using algorithms called betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eccentricity valuation. Lastly, it maps the keywords and their relationships using nodes, edges, colors, size, and space to visually represent many aspects of the dataset's word relationships.

While both the Overview and *Textexture* programs help to visually synthesize a large body of text and highlight keywords and trends in content, the results of the *Textexture* visualization should be slightly different from Overview. *Textexture* should allow for more line-by-line analysis of content trends and, because it maps word relationships spatially, it can indicate patterns in word use with a level of nuance that the Overview program does not provide. The results of the *Textexture* program include detail about the discourse visualized as:

Table 6 Parts of a word relationship graph

nodes	Nodes represent 100 key words, and are symbolized by colored dots that vary in size according to their "betweenness centrality." *Betweenness centrality* determines a node's centrality in the network by identifying the shortest paths through that node. Additionally, nodes that have more influence (or more connections) appear as larger dots.
edges	Edges connect nodes with short lines between words used together, and longer lines for words less often used in conjunction with each other.
colors	Colors represent groupings of words often used together
spacing	Densely spaced nodes visualize words that are often used together, while sparsely or distantly spaced nodes visualize words that are less frequently used together. The words at the center of the visualization are frequently used together, while words at the periphery are less frequently used in the corpus. This force-based layout uses a system of attractions and repulsions according to similarity of or relational use.

By incorporating these details the *Textexture* software allows the researcher to take into account not only word frequency but also word proximity, key contexts, and the comparative significance of words used in the dataset. This process of

visualizing words as a relationship network provides further insight into the U.S. intelligence community's perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic.

As mentioned above, *Textexture* organizes the text into edge, node, and color groups. Nodes represent words, colors represent thematic groupings, and edges link words. A mathematical equation akin to a physical force (like, for example, gravitational pull) is applied to edges and nodes, which gives the network a 3-D feel with a tensile sort of strength. Force is applied in opposite directions to create the *Textexture* graph. Nodes have a repulsive force while edges have an attractive force. The more edges a node has, the closer it will be drawn towards other nodes. The fewer edges a node has, the farther it will pull away from other nodes. Nodes, which visually represent a word's significance in the text, provide a visual means of uncovering patterns in the text.

4.3.2.3 Visualizing Seventeen Secret Cables as a Network

Below is a visualization of the seventeen secret State Department cables from this research project's dataset.[72] While the principles of discourse theory support the assumption that kernels of security fears would be ingrained throughout the dataset, it is prudent to examine these higher classification documents as a single unit to detect any isolated pockets of securitized fear or threat assessment. If a securitized dialogue is occurring in any subset, it will certainly be present in these seventeen items. If no securitized dialogue at all is taking place, then this subset of documents will be free of securitized sentiment.

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[72] "Department Of State Classification Guide (DSCG 05-01)," Department of State, January 2005, https://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dos-class.pdf.

In *Textexture* visual items such as node location, size, and color tell a story about the text. This visualization provides the following insight into the discourse of Russian engagement in the Arctic taking place in these seventeen secret documents:



Figure 10 Word Relationship Graph of Secret Classified documents

Major points of conversation include discussion of “NATO” and “defense;” however, the distance between the NATO and defense nodes indicates that

these issues are not strongly linked to one another. The pink "NATO" node is large and centrally located, while the green "defense" node resides in the southwestern quadrant of the graph. Recalling that *force layout* defines the use of space, it is useful to note how the "defense" node pulls toward nodes for "China" and "Russian," and "NATO" pulls toward the "cooperation" node. This indicates that there is a stronger relationship among the words "China," "Russian," and "defense" in these seventeen documents than there is between "NATO" and "defense."

The network displayed above leads me to understand that "defense" is often discussed in reference to China and Russia, and is strongly tied to an "increase." The program pinpoints every use of the word "increase" in these 17 secret cables. These uses of "increase" include increased anxiety from the West as a result of Russian arms sales to Iran, increased Arctic shipping, increased defense measures on the part of Arctic states, increased collaboration between NATO and non-NATO European member Iceland, and concern stemming from increased Russian activity in Arctic airspaces. The exact text that ties "defense," "China," "Russia," and "increase" together is a 2010 cable from the U.S. embassy in Oslo to multiple entities including the Defense Intelligence Agency, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense regarding comments that Norwegian expert on Russia Anne Kjersti Karlsen made about China (as opposed to NATO and the theater of the Arctic) being Russia's true security threat.[73]

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[73] "EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials." *Wikileaks*, January 26 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OSLO45_a.html.

The large "NATO" node represents text referring to "cooperation," "discussion," and "support." This visualization indicates that the State Department employees sending these cables view NATO as an organization with potential for collaboration or support. The texts using the words "NATO" and "cooperation" reveal discussion of increased NATO cooperation between Arctic states, coordinated NATO exercises, and a comment about the lack of cooperation with non-NATO members (likely alluding to Russia). In the conversations captured by this dataset NATO is either seen as a collaborative force or as a failed collaborator. Either way, the graph documents ways in which NATO is being measured in terms of its collaborative capacity (or lack of capacity).

Applying this same visual analysis process to nodes connecting "Arctic," "Russian," and "Russia," the largest nodes in the network are "ambassador" and "cooperation." This suggests a political, rather than military, context and a cooperative thrust to the discourse. The words "Russia" and "cooperation" appear jointly twice: urging Russia to more fully engage in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Linking nodes "Russia," "role," and "defense" reveals conversations urging Russia to consider building missile defense instead of missiles. Nodes "security" and "defense" stem from a discussion of the political process to build up defense measures for improved security in Iceland, Norway, and Denmark. Nodes "Arctic" and "Russia" link to text about growing concerns regarding Russian involvement in the North; however, European political actors typically generated these comments. The U.S. cables summarize European political actors' perspectives. This excerpt from a document reflects Iceland's

unease with the closing of the Keflavik air base in light of Russia's increased activity in the Arctic: "To these observers the decision to close the base was a strategic mistake: climate change increased shipping routes and oil exploration in the North Atlantic and Arctic and a resurgent Russia will make the High North (and Iceland) more strategically significant in the future not less."[74] The cable's author, U.S. Ambassador to Iceland Carol van Voorst, refers to a conversation among Icelandic politicians about the 2006 closure of the U.S. Naval Air base in Keflavik. Non-U.S. political actors express dissatisfaction with America's weak presence in the Arctic.

These seventeen secret cables from the State Department do not document any highly securitized statements, and no securitized patterns emerge from the analysis tool. The content mentions the United States reducing military engagement in the Arctic region and it expresses European actors' concern over the United States' lack of engagement in the Arctic region. This content may reflect a perception that the United States is pushing other Arctic states to take responsibility for the defense of their homelands. Text reveals that these perceptions stem from U.S. foreign policy at this time, as even here, in secret cables selected to capture discourse on Russian engagement in the Arctic, conversations about the United States' role in Afghanistan take primacy.

In more Arctic-specific statements, the discourse details enduring tensions in NATO-Russia relations and Western European state concerns over Russia's

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[74]Amb. Carol van Voorst, "Icelandic Defense Policy One Year After U.S. Withdrawal," *Wikileaks*, November 9 2007, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07REYKJAVIK322_a.html.

Arctic ambitions. U.S. actors discuss how to support cooperation with Russia in the Arctic in a manner that indicates that the Unite States views cooperation in the Arctic as a stepping-stone towards relationship-building with Russia. For instance, in a 2008 meeting of the United States-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense, attendees agreed "NORAD, NATO, and other allies and friends can send [a message of cooperation] by engaging the Russians where interests are shared, such as Afghanistan, non-proliferation, and search-and-rescue missions in the Arctic."[75] These conversations support my hypothesis that neither the U.S. intelligence nor the policy-making community securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic during this time.

[75] "US-Canada Permanent Joint Board On Defense (PJBD)," *Wikileaks*, December 2 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OTTAWA1508_a.html.

4.3.2.4 Content Patterns across the Entire Dataset

Textexture is an excellent program for non-linear visualizations of text, but as a web-based program it does not have the capacity to visualize this project's full text dataset. A different software platform is required for detecting trends and patterns that occur across the full dataset, a corpus that, in its entirety, includes upwards of 1,500,000 words. *VOSViewer* is free and open-source software that incorporates natural language processing (NLP) to graph word relationships in text. The visualization, similar to *Textexture*'s visualizations, incorporates nodes, edges, size, distance, and colors to map word networks. The *VOSViewer* word-map differs slightly from the *Textexture* program, in that *VOSViewer*'s font, rather than its nodes, changes shape and color.

The visualization of the entire dataset is on the following page. To create this visualization, the program first analyzes the entire text of the dataset. This process includes detecting key terms, calculating the most significant (or central) of the key terms, determining a mathematical relationship between key terms, identifying sub-groupings of key terms, and then visualizing these key terms according to subgroup, significance, and relationship to other key terms. These key terms are also called noun phrases, and as demonstrated in the visualization that follows, many of the key terms are actually multi-word sequences. This process of determining noun phrases is an initial step in the NLP performed by VOS and explains why some nodes in the resultant visualization are multi-word items such as "climate change," or "Bering Strait." This multi-word approach

using noun phrases allows the *VOSViewer* program to capture meaning that *Textexture* may not recognize.

VOSViewer's text analysis detects three major content groups in the dataset, visualized with three different colors, yellow, gray and orange. Loosely defined, the yellow text pertains to Arctic cooperative and political efforts. These include, for example, activities of NATO, Arctic Council, and other Arctic states. Several large-font words represent the most significant key terms of the dataset. These concepts dominate the yellow group, which covers about one fourth of the map. The key terms in the yellow text are: Arctic, cooperation, summary, east, NATO, and Afghanistan. These large nodes represent key themes in the dataset as a whole, and their dominance in the yellow group indicates that these items are often discussed in conjunction with one another. They comprise a micro-network that contains the most significant items in the entire text base, "Arctic" and "cooperation."

The gray text refers mostly to hydrocarbon and mineral extraction efforts in Russia, Russian political entities, and Russian economic or business interests. The largest font gray texts are "Gazprom," "share," "growth," and "ruble." The gray color group is the largest color-group; it dominates half of the map. Unlike the yellow color-group the gray group is comprised of many small-font texts. The gray group's placement farther from the other two color groups illustrates the separate contexts of the topics of discussion. This means its content is taking place with high frequency but in a sub-set of the documents, and not widespread throughout the corpus. The software indicates that the gray group is a discrete

sub-grouping of text that pertains to a diverse set of documents that discusses aspects of hydrocarbon and mineral extraction efforts in Russia, Russian political entities, and Russian economic or business interests.

The orange subgroup occupies the remaining quarter of the map; however, it contains smaller sized text. Its largest text bubbles are “TASS,” “Federation,” “attack,” “community,” and “corruption.” This color-group has the fewest large nodes and is the least dense. The orange subgroup generally pertains to criminal activities, demonstrated by text such as “investigator,” “prosecutor,” “attack,” “fight,” and “police.” The appearance of the subgroup indicates a potentially securitized discourse about crime regarding Russia. All told, however, these findings support my hypothesis of a non-securitized discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic.



Figure 11 VosViewer content analysis of the entire dataset

When viewed as a whole, this dataset contains three main conversations, visualized as color groups. Most important to this inquiry, the dataset addresses "Arctic" "cooperation" that relates in some way to NATO, the United States, Afghanistan and Norway, as shown in yellow. This signifies that the Arctic is often seen as a region with potential for cooperation. However cooperation in this context is a complex and multi-directional concept. Given the variety of speakers and actors in this conversation, many forms of cooperation arise. A few examples of this *Arctic cooperation* discourse include:

- a 2006 cable documenting a desire to engage Russia via the United States and Norway on "'High North' issues -- energy, the environment, non-proliferation and cooperation with Russia;"[76]
- A 2008 cable documenting "United States interest in dialogue and collaboration in the Arctic" with the Nordic Councils of Ministers;[77]
- a 2008 cable documenting comments of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs stressing "increased United States-High North engagement, noting broad support for Norway's initiative and our shared interest in cooperation in the region and in dealing with Russia."[78] A header in the document, "Stroking the Norwegians on High North,"

[76] Amb. Benson Whitney, "Ambassador's Introductory Call On Deputy FM Stubholt Centers On High North," *Wikileaks*, January 26 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06OSLO86_a.html.

[77] Amb. James P. Cain, "Nordic Council Open To Renewable Energy R&D Partnership Idea," *Wikileaks*, September 19 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08COPENHAGEN499_a.html.

[78] "A/S Kimmitt's October 15-16 Visit To Oslo," *Wikileaks*, October 29 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OSLO582_a.html.

illustrates a conscious U.S. effort to support Norwegian engagement with Russia in the matter of the 'High North,' a Norwegian and Canadian term for their Arctic regions;

- a 2009 cable capturing Canadian cynicism over cooperation with Russia, NATO, Afghanistan and the Arctic;[79]
- a 2009 cable capturing Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko's comments on Russian concerns about security cooperation with NATO and priorities of the Arctic;[80] and
- a 2010 document about NATO bilateral meetings: "on the margins of the January 14 NATO Strategic Concept Seminar EUR/RPM Director Bruce Turner, DCM, and PolOff conducted bilateral meetings January 13 to discuss Afghanistan, NATO, Russia, and the Arctic High North." [81]

Arctic cooperation in this discourse is a matter of desire (United States, NATO and Norwegian), strategy (United States), and derision (Canada, Russia). That being said, the text that is closest to and comparable in size to "cooperation" is "Arctic." In the entire dataset "Arctic" and "cooperation" have the strongest edge with 236 co-occurrences. This demonstrates these two key contexts are most significantly and frequently used together.

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[79] "Canada's 'Calibrated' Re-Engagement With Russia In Step With U.S.," *Wikileaks*, April 7 2009 https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09OTTAWA278_a.html.

[80] Amb. John Beyrle, "DFM Grushko On Georgia, Energy Security, And European Security." *Wikileaks*, February 13, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MOSCOW355_a.html.

[81] "EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials." *Wikileaks*, January 26 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OSLO45_a.html.

The gray color group represents a tendency of the dataset to discuss hydrocarbon industry and the Russian economy. Gazprom and Rosneft are two of the largest nodes, and they connect through edges to such terms as pipeline, share, growth, investor, ruble, loan, shareholder, and barrel. Key terms such as share, growth, investor, shareholder, and loan indicate a business context in the dataset. Key terms pipeline, barrel, and exploration highlight the role hydrocarbons in the Russian economy in this dataset, while also illustrating their connection to Gazprom and Rosneft. This color grouping is the largest of the dataset, indicating that most significant items in the dataset pertain to hydrocarbon industries. The orange color group represents the smallest subgroup of the dataset. This aspect of the conversation highlights criminal activity with large nodes for “corruption,” “attack,” “fight,” and “police.”

VOSViewer reveals significant content patterns in the dataset. These include content about Arctic cooperation in regards to NATO, Norway, the United States and Afghanistan, content about Russian energy firms Gazprom and Rosneft, and content about criminal activity in Russia. The findings of this content analysis provide no indication of widespread securitization of Russian engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s within the intelligence data set.



RUSSIA SLOW TO MOBILIZE ON ENVIRONMENT WORKING GROUP COOPERATION

Date:	2009 December 15, 08:49 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID:	09MOSCOW3013_a
Original Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Handling Restrictions	-- Not Assigned --	Character Count:	11551
Executive Order:	-- Not Assigned --	Locator:	TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:	EAID - Economic Affairs--Foreign Assistance | EFIS - Economic Affairs--Fishing | KCRM - Criminal Activity | KGHG - Global Climate Change | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | RS - Russia | SENV - Social Affairs--Environment	Concepts:	-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:	-- Not Assigned --	Type:	TE - Telegram (cable)
Office Origin:	-- N/A OR BLANK --	Archive Status:	-- Not Assigned --
Office Action:	-- N/A OR BLANK --		
From:	RUSSIA MOSCOW	Markings:	-- Not Assigned --
To:	DENMARK COPENHAGEN | DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR | GROUP DESTINATIONS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (CEST) | NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL | RUCPDC NOAA | RUSSIA MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE | SECRETARY OF DEFENSE | SECRETARY OF STATE | UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY		

Content | Raw content | Metadata — Share | Print — Show Headers

Classified By: EST Counselor Deborah Klepp for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Russian working-level coordinator of the Environment Working Group under the Bilateral Presidential Commission told us on December 11 that the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) would likely be interested in working with the United States under the Working Group on biodiversity, protected territories, chemical and waste management, environmental governance, technological issues, and climate change. However, the Ministry's leadership is not focused on the Working Group, and the Foreign Ministry has not issued guidance to MNRE on the Working Group's functioning or instructions to formulate an agenda for cooperation. He further cautioned that Working Group projects should first be discussed and developed on the working level. He criticized how the United States developed and presented its recent working-level proposal to jump-start cooperation to reduce black carbon emissions in the Arctic. Since it was not discussed with Russian experts in advance, it was "poorly developed" and stands "no chance" of Russian approval. The MFA's Senior Arctic Official on December 14

Figure 12 A Cable on Wikileaks

4.3.2.5 Word Networks Summary

There is no strong indication in either the seventeen secret cables or in the entire dataset that the Arctic is discussed in a predominantly securitized tone. In the seventeen cables the discourse pertains to collaborative or European security efforts, and efforts to better determine the role of the United States, NATO and the Arctic Council in security efforts. While the dataset includes references to concern about Russian activity and future planning for the Arctic, these reflect Icelandic and Norwegian concerns. Nothing in the seventeen secret cables indicates U.S. securitization of Russian engagement in the Arctic. Discourse patterns in the entire discourse as visualized for key term trends, significance, and relationships indicate that first and foremost the United States is interested in Arctic cooperation, followed by close monitoring of Russian energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft. Lastly, the entire dataset reveals a sub-grouping of interest in criminal activity in Russia and references to Afghanistan. Concepts such as threat, risk, and fear are notably absent in the analysis/visualization.

4.3.3 Location Analysis

Using a text analysis tool I extracted all location entities from the dataset including both Cablegate and GI Files documents. Note that these location entities were extracted from all text, including sending information. After much data-cleaning to remove non-locations (such as company names and names of people), the locations “Arctic” and “Russia” (as these location names were the

selection criteria for the dataset and would have been in almost all documents), and continent names (which could not functionally be visualized), there remained 6,722 geographic location entities. Many of these were the same location mentioned repeatedly. At 461 times, Moscow was mentioned the most frequently in the entire dataset. Below is a map showing all location entities mentioned and visualized by geographic location and frequency of mention.



Figure 13 Point location entities

This visualization shows how the densest and most frequently mentioned locations are in Western Europe and the Middle East. Russian locations include mentions along the Russian Arctic coast, but elsewhere as well. Russian locations are often Arctic and non-Arctic oil or gas fields, political hotspots in non-Arctic regions such as the Caucasus, Chechnya, and political centers such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Outside of the two major metropolises, Russian

location mentions are relatively geographically consistent across populated areas in both density and frequency. With the exception of the Moscow outlier, the number of locations mentioned in Russia, however, is certainly not more than in other parts of the world; in fact, it is on par with location mentions in Africa or South America.

This visualization illustrates that during this time period, U.S. intelligence was more concerned with political and economic events happening in the traditional centers of Western economic and political activity than with surveillance of specific Russian localities. Another way to interpret this is that U.S. intelligence is more concerned with developments in Europe, the Middle East, and Northern Africa than it is with specific developments in the Russian Arctic. Given U.S. engagement in the Middle East during this time, this makes sense. The map certainly does not indicate a securitized stance regarding Russian activities in the Arctic. In fact, it suggests a lack of interest.

Traditional U.S. partners in the Arctic within NATO or the UN receive more geographic mentions than Russian Arctic locations. Perhaps U.S. is more intent on monitoring Arctic partners than it is on monitoring Arctic Russia. Alternatively, the map may reflect the fact that Moscow and St. Petersburg are centers of decision-making in Russia. They, rather than remote Arctic locations, may therefore attract the interest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Whatever the reason, in terms of location entity and frequency of mention across the dataset, there does not appear to be intense or focused interest either in Russian geographic locations, in Russian Arctic locations, or in Arctic locations

at all. The location data from the data set indicates that the Russian Arctic is either treated here as a periphery to Moscow's core, or the Arctic as a whole is a peripheral concern to the intelligence gathering places in these pages.

This raises the question, what do these locations say about the IC and the Arctic? Why are there not more mentions of other locations? The dataset contains little to no mention of U.S. sub-Arctic or Arctic locations; in fact the island nation of Trinidad and Tobago is mentioned more often (5 times) than Anchorage, which is Alaska's economic center (3 times). Alaska itself receives as many mentions (18) as Indonesia, New Delhi, and Vienna. Specific locations that fall within the Arctic geographical region are not the focal point of specific geographic points mentioned in this dataset.

Table 7 Fifty most frequently mentioned locations in the dataset

Legend:

Burnt Sienna	*Arctic Council member state or decision-making center of Arctic nation*
Marigold	*Arctic Council observer states and their respective decision-making centers*
Light Grey	*Neighbors to Arctic nations or non-Arctic cities in Arctic nations*
Charcoal	*Oil-producing or pipeline transit nations*

Moscow 461	China 184	Afghanistan 152	St. Petersburg 140	Germany 135
Georgia 121	Norway 118	London 114	Iran 107	Soviet Union 105
France 101	Middle East 100	Canada 88	Turkey 88	Poland 83
Black Sea 82	Kazakhstan 75	Arctic Ocean 73	India 73	Finland 71
Sweden 67	Libya 64	New York 63	N. Caucasus 62	England 60
Japan 59	North Sea 57	Chechnya 53	Oslo 51	Azerbaijan 49
Brazil 48	Bulgaria 48	Pakistan 48	Caucasus 46	Iraq 46
Italy 46	Czech Rep. 45	Greece 43	Barents Sea 42	Denmark 42
Beijing 41	Spain 41	South Korea 39	Israel 37	Syria 36
Baltic Sea 35	Gulf of Mexico 35	North Korea 35	Paris 35	Baltic 33

The fifty most mentioned locations in the dataset show a loose pattern of Arctic locations, political or geographic centers of Arctic nations, and Arctic Council observer states; these comprise a good two-thirds of the geographic mentions. Arctic-bordering nations or localities make up another group. The remaining location entities have one obvious commonality: they are either oil or gas producing or transit nations.

Of the fifty most-mentioned locations in the data set only twelve are Arctic nations or decision-making centers[82] of Arctic nations. These locations are Moscow, St. Petersburg, Norway, the Soviet Union, Canada, Arctic Ocean,

[82] While New York is a decision-making center for the US, an Arctic nation, for the purposes of this work it will not be considered an *Arctic* decision-making center.

Finland, Sweden, North Sea, Oslo, Barents Sea, and Denmark. Arctic Council observer states and decision-making centers[83] mentioned are China, Germany, London, France, Poland, India, England, Japan, Italy, Beijing, Spain, South Korea and Paris. Counting the fifty most mentioned locations this way, half of the most mentioned locations are Arctic Council members or observers. To extend the geographic criteria to include areas bordering Arctic nations, the handful of remaining locations are all oil-producing or pipeline-crossing locations[84] (Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, Turkey, Libya, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Pakistan, Iraq, Czech Republic, Greece, Israel, Syria, Gulf of Mexico) as well as locations of national interest to the United States (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran) in the timeframe of the dataset (2004 - 2011). Location mentions imply that the intelligence in this dataset is primarily concerned with global oil-production, Western centers of governance, and Arctic Council member states. There is no noticeable focus on location points in the Russian Arctic, leading me to conclude that there was no specific interest in developments taking place in Russian Arctic locales.

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[83] Specifically; London, Beijing and Paris

[84] "World Pipelines Maps - Crude Oil (petroleum) Pipelines - Natural Gas Pipelines - Products Pipelines," *Theodora.com*, May 6, 2008, http://www.theodora.com/pipelines/world_oil_gas_and_products_pipelines.html.

4.3.4 Summary of the Micro-Level Analysis

This portion of the analysis examined content for patterns that helped profile the intelligence contained in this dataset. Sentiment analysis was not conclusive; however, it did not demonstrate a securitized leaning. This conclusion rests on the fact that analysis tools detected only 29 percent of the documents in the dataset to have a negative sentiment. Content analysis using the document-sorting tool *Overview* detected that the dataset had content groups pertaining to Russian energy industry, Russian political actors and groups, international energy companies, crime, legality and emergencies. Content analysis of the seventeen secret cables as a word relationship network using the graphing tool *Textexture* revealed a political and diplomatic leaning to the dataset. The most significant word in the graph, "NATO," is strongly and often linked to ideas of "cooperation." Line by line analysis of occurrences of the significant word "defense" reveals no strongly securitized discussion that falls out of the realm of normal political and diplomatic dialogue. My line-by-line analysis supports this visual analysis. Content analysis of all text using the *VOSViewer* program reveals three major content groups. These groups pertain to cooperative political efforts in the Arctic, the energy industry in Russia, and criminal / legal issues in Russia. The data visualization tools *VOSViewer*, *Textexture*, and *Overview* do not reveal securitized conversations in the dataset. These findings differ in their content analysis results; however, my line-by-line analysis supports the non-securitized claim.

The words “Arctic” and “cooperation” are the largest nodes in *VosViewer* and are so closely linked in the dataset as to be visually represented as overlapping. Far from indicating a securitized dialogue, the analysis illuminates a very diplomatic and even congenial tone. Russia is discussed in terms of its energy industry and legal/corruption issues. Location analysis supported these findings as the top fifty most-mentioned locations were in Arctic Council member states, observer states, or energy producing or energy-transit states. Absent from larger scale content trends are sub-national Russian Arctic leaders and mentions of permanent participants to the Arctic Council. Content about the Arctic Council demonstrates United States support for the governing body.

Content analysis performed in different ways with different analytical tools and subsections of the data consistently supports a narrative of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the Arctic, including through the Arctic Council, and a view of Russian Arctic engagement as economically focused; that is, focused on the Russian energy industry.

4.4 Macro-Analysis

The final phase of analysis focuses on the inter-textual dialogue between intelligence documents and seven U.S. Arctic policy documents, looking for similar patterns in the intelligence and policy. My purpose is not to assert causality, or even to detect whether influence is created passively or actively, directionally, and so on. I merely seek to determine whether intelligence discourses agree with policy discourses in regards to Russian Arctic engagement. Building on Foucault's theories of discursive formations, I assume that a degree of shared content and seemingly shared values indicate agreement between these two different groups: intelligence analysts and policy makers. By applying the previously used tools for content, location and sentiment analysis to seven U.S. Arctic policy documents, I expect to detect a shared discursive stance between intelligence documents and U.S. Arctic policy documents.

While ultimately the project's aim is to detect whether intelligence or policy securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s, I also aim to detect and explain any major differences between this dataset's intelligence and policy documents. For instance, I expect that policy will not contain frank language about threat and risk. I expect intelligence documents to reflect a higher degree of frankness. Policy is official, public, and enduring. I expect that policy sentiment will be neutral or even positive as its language may reflect a desire to project optimism. Additionally, policy is less likely to be specific, and when compared to intelligence it will carry less nuanced detail about places, people, and events of concern. In policy documents, location entities likely will be

more regional or generalized in nature. Policy is more likely to reference domestic actors and locations, whereas intelligence is more concerned with monitoring "the other," and is less likely to focus on domestic issues. In summary, policy is likely to be more homogenous and vague and is expected to be more aspirational in tone and more domestic-minded.

Before launching into the macro-analysis, I will recap the most pertinent findings from the micro and meso-level analyses. Firstly, recall that the intelligence documents in the dataset are predominantly open source private intelligence or unclassified or confidential State Department cables. Therefore, I can only draw conclusions based on what these documents reveal. It is possible that other documents would reveal a more securitized U.S. stance on Russian engagement in the Arctic.

Secondly, tagging patterns and sending habits on these cables indicate that the State Department viewed Russian engagement in the Arctic as a political affair, and far less a defense concern. One could argue that the dataset would naturally lean towards diplomatic categorization, given its origin in the State Department. The State Department's option for categorizing information as a defense or military affair was nevertheless underutilized in the dataset. Tagging and recipient information emphasize Arctic states and international organizations such as NATO, the UN, and the EU. Other types of Arctic stakeholders: indigenous political entities, international environmental groups, industry organizations, or, even domestic political leaders in Alaska were not among the top recipients of these cables. These patterns corroborate a perception within the

State Department of Russian engagement in the Arctic as "politics as usual." The cables reflect dialogue among nation states with established and cordial power dynamics. The tagging and sending patterns also suggest that the U.S. State Department associates the Arctic with European politics.

Location entities mentioned in both State Department cables and Stratfor internal emails display a wide geographic spread, with a higher frequency of Western European locations. Few Arctic geographic locations appear, and no pattern of focus in Russian Arctic locations arises. This pattern indicates that both Stratfor and the State Department view Arctic and Russian Arctic issues as falling under the purview of traditional geographic and political centers of influence. Both Stratfor and the State Department view Arctic concerns through a geopolitical lens. Moreover, the drivers of Arctic developments reside in Moscow and other European capital cities south of the Arctic Circle. This perception aligns with centuries of core-periphery relations between the Arctic and southern power centers.

In the following section I compare the findings from meso- and micro-level analysis of intelligence documents with content, location and sentiment analysis of seven U.S. Arctic policy documents. Although these documents will look and feel different from the intelligence documents, this section will emphasize similar patterns to shed light on why the United States did not securitize Russian engagement in the Arctic.

4.4.1 Content Analysis Comparing Intelligence and Policy

The seven U.S. Arctic policy documents in question were issued between 2009 and 2015. With the exception of assessments produced by the Government Accountability Office, these seven documents comprise all existing national and agency level policy documents specifically pertaining to the U.S. Arctic. Given policy creation cycles, it stands to reason that intelligence collected during 2007 – 2011 would inform (at least in some way) policies published from 2009 to 2013.

The policies published in 2014 and 2015 are the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Arctic Action Plan, and an executive order from President Obama. Because NOAA is unlikely to rely heavily on intelligence from the State Department or Stratfor, and because 2014 and 2015 were significantly different geopolitical contexts from the latest intelligence in the dataset, these two documents will serve as a check, or "control group," on my analysis of the interplay between intelligence and policy in the earlier era. I expect the tone of these documents to be significantly different from the 2009 and 2013 documents generated by the President, Department of Defense (DOD), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Navy.

In 2009, the U.S. government published one major Arctic document, the National Security Presidential Directive 66 (NSPD-66). The NSPD-66 stressed homeland security, protection of Arctic resources, sustainable economic development, and collaborative international governance. While U.S. Arctic-related policy and legislation pre-dates the NSPD-66 (including boundary agreements with Canada/Britain and Russia/USSR), the NSPD-66 is considered

the first modern policy document to specify the United States' approach to protecting and developing its Arctic region. Following the Bush Administration's NSPD-66, the executive branch produced no policy on the Arctic until 2013, when the Obama Administration produced the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.[85] The 2013 National Strategy represents an unprecedented and comprehensive policy document on the U.S. Arctic, and is recognized as such by official Arctic strategy documents from federal agencies including the U.S. Department of Defense (2013)[86] and the USCG (2013).[87]

U.S. federal agencies released three major policy documents in 2014 including the Executive's Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region,[88] the U.S. Navy's "Arctic Roadmap,"[89] and NOAA's "Arctic Action Plan."[90] So far 2015 has already seen two significant developments, an Executive Order to "Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic"[91]

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[85] "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," The White House, 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.

[86] "Arctic Strategy," Department of Defense, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.

[87] "United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy," *United States Coast Guard*, 2013, http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CG_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.

[88] "Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region." *The White House*, 2014. http://arctic.gov/publications/related/imp_plan_for_natl_strategy_for_arctic_region.pdf.

[89] "U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 – 2030," *Navy Task Force for Climate Change, Chief of Naval Operations,* n.d., http://www.navy.mil/docs/USN_arctic_roadmap.pdf.

[90] "NOAA's Arctic Action Plan: Supporting the National Strategy for the Arctic Region," NOAA, 2014, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/NOAAarcticactionplan2014.pdf.

[91] "Executive Order - Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic," *Whitehouse.gov*, Accessed March 10, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/executive-order-enhancing-coordination-national-efforts-arctic.

and a controversial step by President Obama to protect ANWR, presented via video on the Whitehouse YouTube channel.[92]

4.4.1.1 Sentiment Analysis and Keyword Entity Comparing Intelligence and Policy

Sentiment analysis performed by *AlchemyAPI* found all seven policy documents to be positive in sentiment. While I expected a tendency towards neutral sentiment in the policy documents, consistently positive sentiment is not surprising. The content of these documents is largely aspirational; content makes repeated references to hopes and expectations for the Arctic region. The documents consistently emphasize peaceful cooperation in the Arctic and American desires for good stewardship of Arctic resources. The *AlchemyAPI* program designates these aspirational sentiments, even those in DOD documents, as positive.

As a control, I examined the sentiment of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to see whether its tone would reflect perceptions of risk or threat.[93] START addresses a securitized issue that is contemporary (with the dataset) and content-related, but not contained within the policy dataset. Interestingly, *AlchemyAPI* also detected positive document sentiment within New START. The document certainly addresses a tense issue, and a defense issue;

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[92] *Protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge*, *The White House*, accessed March 10, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hey_WIAFVA&feature=youtu.be.

[93] "Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms," US Department of State, 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.

however, the treaty reflects successful diplomatic handling of a defense issue. In contrast, *Alchemy* detects negative sentiment in the 2003 U.S. federal policy on Iraq.[94] These examples illustrate that not all policy on securitized issues will exhibit neutral or negative sentiment, and that a fully securitized issue can evoke positive sentiment in policy. *AlchemyAPI*'s detection of positive sentiment in all seven U.S. Arctic policy documents in this research project's dataset may support my hypothesis of a lack of national security threat from the Arctic overall, and a lack of threat detected from Russian engagement in the area, although I can draw no firm conclusions based on this particular phase of the analysis.

Another interesting finding illuminated by *AlchemyAPI* concerns the keyword entity "Russia" (also "Russian Federation") in these documents. The *AlchemyAPI* program found that the seven policy documents either made no mention of Russia or mentioned Russia in a positive or neutral tone. None of the seven documents demonstrate negative sentiment towards the entity Russia or the Russian Federation. In fact, they seldom mention Russia or the Federation. Policy documents reveal no overt concern that the government or government agencies may have about the U.S.' Arctic neighbor to the west.

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[94] "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," *National Security Council*, November 30 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113000376.html.

4.4.1.2 Document Sorting and Word Relationship Graphs

I employed the *Overview* program again to reveal content patterns in the seven Arctic policies. This process compares the key terms of all seven documents to determine similarities among the documents. *Overview* then groups similar and dissimilar documents in a document tree, and identifies key words in the document groupings and, ultimately, the entire corpus. Below I provide a summary of the key findings of the content analysis performed by the *Overview* program. Following this summary of findings I analyze how these findings pertain to the question of securitization of Russian engagement in the Arctic in U.S. policy and intelligence. According to *Overview*'s algorithmic processing, the most common words shared by the seven U.S. Arctic policy documents are Alaska, environment, indigenous, Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, DOD, airspace, progress, Alaska native, and offshore. These key words are quite different than those *Overview* detected within the intelligence dataset. Indigenous concerns and U.S. domestic concerns were not key topics in the intelligence dataset; however, they are front and center in the policy dataset. Specific mentions of U.S. federal agencies are self-references and will be disregarded for that reason. Remaining key items, environment, airspace, progress, and offshore are interesting. The word "environment" (or "environmental") is mentioned in all policy documents. The word "progress" is mentioned in all documents with the exception of the DOD Arctic policy, the NSPD, and the USCG document. "Airspace" is mentioned in three of the policy documents: the 2013 DOD document, the 2014 Implementation plan, and the National Strategy document.

Only two documents mention “offshore,” and these are the 2013 Implementation Plan and the 2013 USCG document.

Overview groups the 2009 NSPD, the 2013 U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, the 2013 National Arctic Strategy and the Implementation plan under the same document tree. This demonstrates similarity of content through a similarity of word usage. The 2014 Navy Arctic Roadmap, 2013 DOD Arctic Strategy, and the 2015 Executive Order fall into individual document trees, demonstrating more unique content. Below is a table highlighting the keywords detected by *Overview* by policy document.

Table 8 Key content in each policy document

Year	Title	Overview's key words	Categorization
2009	NSPD 66	hydrocarbon, coordination, agencies shall, carrying	verbs, future // industry concerns, intergovernmental collaboration to achieve goals
2013	USCG	offshore, northern/north, bering, coast guard	industry, shipping / vessel traffic route
2013	EXE - IMP	end of, progress, next steps, measuring, department of	coordination, logistical planning, marking progress towards goal
2013	EXE	airspace, peaceful, conflict, indigenous, Alaska, mapping, environment	some defense / security (airspace, conflict), however this is balanced by research (mapping), "environment" and "indigenous" content, seen as "Alaska" not, for example: "nation"
2013	DOD	DoD, desired, department, "defense arctic," DHS, Navy, airspace	"department" and "defense arctic" likely come from the document name "department of defense arctic strategy," seen as an inter-agency issue involving DOD, DHS, Navy, and airspace concerns
2014	Navy	USCG, naval, "navy will," Route, Cold, Sea	USCG and Navy joint issue, future intention (as opposed to current action), likely "Route" is reference to NSR, capitalized "Cold" refers to a few mentions of the Cold War, a few mentions to the U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook, the annual Cold Response exercise, and the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (ACRREL)
2014	NOAA	NOP, NSAR, IARPC, NMFS	National groups, policies and agencies that operate in the Arctic including: the National Ocean Policy (NOP), National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR), Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
2015	EXE - ORD	"Alaska native," "native organizations," chair, "tribal governments," "officer"	indigenous government, domestic sub-state political organizations and actors

As expected, none of the policy documents, including policies from Department of Defense and Navy make a strong securitized stance. This finding affirms my hypothesis that U.S. Arctic policy was not and is not widely securitized.

Content analysis performed using the visualization program *Textexture* identifies the key words Arctic, united, state, (coming from the entity the United States), and region. Russia does not feature prominently in the visualization, meaning that it is not mentioned frequently in the text of the dataset. Likewise, the word defense does not dominate. The program identifies the most influential contexts in this text as:

#0: arctic region including nation
#1: state united international cooperation
#2: effort line principle opportunity
#3: resource energy development management

These influential contexts, as the program calls them, do not indicate any securitized language. Instead, these policies appear to be more concerned with cooperation and sustainable management of resources.

4.4.2 Arctic Policy Location Entities

Below is a map (Figure 15) of all location entities mentioned in U.S. Arctic policy documents. Visualizing this data as a map provides a complete and systematic view of the specific geographies of concern for U.S. Arctic policy-makers. This concern could have a securitized focus or a political focus; only my examination of the text line by line will reveal the nature of the concern. Certain locations carry obvious significance, while other locations have a more ambiguous context that requires referencing the original document. For example, the mention of Fort Wainwright in Alaska likely refers to a security or defense issue: it is a U.S. Army base. A mention of Murmansk, a port city in Russia, however, that is home to an Arctic naval fleet and oil and gas development may have significance in a security context or as an industry hub.



Figure 14 Location entities in U.S. Arctic policy documents

Geographic locations mentioned in high frequency in U.S. Arctic policy are the eight Arctic nations, the Arctic Ocean and locations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic region, such as the Arctic Basin and the Faroe Islands. The documents reference the United States and Alaska frequently. Compared to the map of location entities in the intelligence dataset, there is a significantly higher number of references to Alaska and Alaskan locations. Arctic Council observer states India, China, Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Poland received a few mentions each; while the observer states Netherlands and Singapore are not mentioned. Island locations such as Tasmania and Hawaii, and locations such as the Great Lakes in the Midwestern U.S. and Montreal also are mentioned - locations not obviously related to the Arctic. The policy

documents tend to reference Arctic Council member states and observer states, which indicates support for the work of the Arctic Council and its consensus-based approach to Arctic governance.

The density of Alaskan location entities (see Figure 16) includes mentions to ports and fishing hubs such as Norton Sound, Bristol Bay and Dutch Harbor, villages such as Kivalina (population 377 in 2000 census) and Beaver (population 84 in 2000 census), industry hubs such as Nome (mining), North Slope Borough and Barrow (oil and gas), the military base Fort Wainwright, and population centers, such as Barrow and Anchorage.

These policy documents do not mention Juneau, the state capital, or Fairbanks, Alaska's second largest city and home to University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), the state's land, space, and sea grant institution. Juneau's absence in the dataset is not surprising, given that American defense policy emanates from Washington, DC.



Figure 15 Location entities in U.S. Arctic policy documents

Maritime Arctic and sub-Arctic references include the East Bering Sea, Pacific Arctic Ocean, Greenland Sea, Hudson Strait, Hudson Bay, Labrador Sea, Chukchi Sea, and sea routes such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The frequency of maritime locations illustrates concern for Arctic waterways, suggesting a corresponding interest in the shipping and fishing industries, possibly in seafaring fleets and in environmental concerns. The Caribbean Sea, Panama Canal, and Gulf of Mexico are also mentioned, most likely for their transit and industry capacities. The NSR is mentioned more than forty times,

while the lesser Arctic passages are not a focal point of the dataset. The Northwest Passage (NWP) is mentioned seven times in the dataset, the Northeast Passage (NEP) is mentioned once, and the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) is not mentioned at all.

From a defense perspective, the policy documents mention Thule in Greenland and the Thule Airbase. The documents make one mention of Fort Wainwright, Alaska. No mention is made of Alaska's Elmendorf Air Force Base, which is home to the Alaskan NORAD Region, Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK) and the Alaskan Command (ALCOM). Kodiak, home of the U.S. Coast Guard in Alaska, is mentioned twice. The Coast Guard forward operating location (FOL) of Barrow is also mentioned twice; however no specific mention is made of the U.S. Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak. This absence of references to military installations is not unique to Alaska. The only mention of a defense installation in an Arctic nation is Thule.

Nor are Russian political centers Moscow and St. Petersburg mentioned. In fact no mention at all is made of any land-based Russian geographies. Policy does, however, mention several Russian Arctic maritime features, including the Barents, Kara, White, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi Seas and the Northern Sea Route.

In U.S. Arctic policy documents the most mentioned location entities are Alaskan, Alaskan coastal, European, and Arctic water bodies. Policy documents contain geographically distributed references to Arctic bodies of water, which include Arctic and sub-Arctic seas, oceans straits and bays surrounding Alaska,

Canada, Greenland, Scandinavia and all along the long Russian Arctic coastline. Policy documents mention predominantly coastal locations known for their mining, fishing, oil and gas extraction, or shipping industries, demonstrating an industry-leaning or an oceans-focus in policy-makers' understanding of the Arctic.

Both policy and intelligence highlight Arctic Council member states and observer states, however most locations mentioned lie in Western Europe and the Northeast United States. While U.S. intelligence in the dataset mentions Middle Eastern locations and Russian land-based locations, U.S. Arctic policy documents do not. Neither intelligence nor policy documents place consistent emphasis on defense or security geographic locations. Similar patterning of location references reinforce the theory that the policy and intelligence communities treat the Arctic as a region of political interest that also concerns the Arctic Council and Western-European entities. This emphasis in policy documents supports my hypothesis of a perception of low threat emanating from Russian engagement in the Arctic.

4.4.3 Summary

Arctic policy is a finalized product that incorporates intelligence from many sources and is influenced by numerous stakeholders. Analysis tools led me to conclude that policy documents reflect an even lesser degree of alarm or threat detection from Russian engagement in the Arctic than seen in the intelligence documents. This is in part due to the aspirational and hopeful forward-looking tone of these Arctic policy documents. The measured tone of the policy documents reflects U.S. interest in engaging in the Arctic collaboratively with other Arctic and European states. It could also reflect the influence of other strains of intelligence or other stakeholder opinions. Arctic policy exhibits influence from other actors than Stratfor and the State Department, in its references to indigenous and Alaskan affairs, topics not emphasized in either of the intelligence datasets. This is expected: numerous constituencies and stakeholders influence U.S. Arctic policy.

Even personal typologies of individuals in positions of power, their job functions, and organizational culture affect policy documents. Writes James McCormick in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*: "the personal characteristics of individuals (personality traits, perceptions, and psychological predispositions), the role responsibilities that the individual assumes within the decision process (as president, national security adviser, or secretary of

treasury), and the differing bureaucratic environments (the FBI versus the CIA, for instance) in which individuals operate affect policy choices."[95]

Intelligence, while striving to operate in a separate sphere from policy so as to remain untainted by political influence, can never truly escape the influence from policymakers' and politics. McCormick discusses the myriad opportunities for the politicization of intelligence, noting,

> politicization of intelligence can take many forms, from the most blatant, in which intelligence is explicitly told what conclusions it should reach, to the less obvious, including demoting people who produce the 'wrong' answer, putting in place personnel whose views are consistent with those of the top leaders, reducing the resources going to units whose analyses are troubling, and the operation of unconscious bias by analysts who fear that their careers will be damaged by producing undesired reports. Even more elusive may be what one analyst has called 'politicization by omission."[96]

Intelligence, like all speech and text, is a part of the transactional exchanges of power that shape identities, create meaning, and communicate desires, fears and perceptions about the world. This research project recognizes the multitudes of influences upon policies, while at the same time acknowledging the possibility that State Department and Stratfor intelligence may be among these influencers.

Both the policy and intelligence datasets analyzed in this project show a propensity to refer to and document engagement with Western European political power centers. Both datasets have documented concern for the energy industry. Both datasets view the Arctic as a region of political and economic interest, and, to a lesser degree, a defense concern.

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[95] James M. McCormick, *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 16.
[96] Ibid, 280.

To recapitulate, I find U.S. Arctic policy to be less securitized than intelligence documents. While policy does mention security and defense concerns shared by Arctic partners such as Norway and Canada, and domestic partnerships between U.S. federal agencies, these references all take the tone of "normal" diplomatic discussions. Ultimately, both policy and intelligence analyzed in this project demonstrate a non-securitized tone.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

This project's intelligence dataset would not have been available for study without the efforts of Wikileaks and the work of whistleblowers and hacktivists such as Chelsea Manning and Anonymous. Outsiders are not meant to study the intelligence community. Intelligence organizations rely on secrecy. Wikileaks' work in the arena of government transparency has allowed me not only to *read* secret and internal documents that pertain to Arctic affairs, but by making this information freely accessible and downloadable, Wikileaks has made deep analysis of this discourse possible.

That being said, the multi-faceted analysis of more than 600 documents performed in this thesis reveals that this secrecy is largely unwarranted. The perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic captured in this intelligence dataset do not appear to differ greatly from widespread public opinion of Russian behavior readily accessible in the news media and in foreign policy forums. In fact, opinions expressed in the media by some high-ranking intelligence and defense personnel reflect greater concern than that which was captured in this intelligence dataset.

As stated elsewhere, the news media have securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic much more than either the intelligence captured here or U.S. policy over the course of the last decade. State Department cables are particularly measured in their language. The handful of statements captured in this project's intelligence dataset that expressed concern typically originated from non-U.S. speakers. Intelligence from another, more defense-oriented intelligence

agency with an inherently more securitized view of Russia (and the world in general) may well yield different results, but, to state the obvious, I did not have access to such intelligence.

This research could be expanded and improved in a variety of ways. Gaining access to different intelligence sources such as Department of Defense-sponsored intelligence or items created by or for specific consumption of the Central Intelligence Agency or Defense Intelligence Agency, could clarify whether this particular dataset reflected a predisposition towards less-securitized or more diplomatic discourses.

Another way this project could be expanded in scope would be to analyze all of the more than 11,000 documents shared through Wikileaks that mention the "Arctic" and "Russia." Analyzing all available data would allow greater confidence in the findings. However such an undertaking would require far more time than I could reasonably allot to this aspect of the thesis research. Finally, by adding a temporal aspect, I would be able to more fully analyze how the discourse evolved over time. This could help determine whether a subset of the discourse became securitized at a particular point in time, but more generally it would help to better track content patterns that are affected by temporal factors.

This research has determined that, as reflected in this dataset, U.S. policy and U.S. Arctic intelligence are in agreement in not securitizing Russian engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s. The data shows clearly that the answer to my first research question: "Did intelligence securitize Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s?" is no. Documents in this dataset are not

predominantly negative in sentiment, and are just as likely to be neutral or positive as negative in sentiment. The most classified items in the dataset, 17 secret cables, contain content that discuss cooperative aspects of NATO's capacity predominantly. Other main content trends pertain to Arctic cooperation and developments in the Russian energy sector. While security and defense issues arise, and security and defense actors in the Arctic participate and are mentioned in this dataset, the data does not exhibit a securitized tone.

The second question of this thesis was, "Do narrative patterns and perceptions in U.S. Arctic intelligence align with U.S. Arctic policy?" Analysis and comparison of content and sentiment patterns find that U.S. Arctic policy is less securitized in tone than the U.S. Arctic intelligence examined here. This conclusion rests on the generally positive sentiment in the Arctic policy documents, the absence of references to Russia, and the more frequent mentions of diplomatic entities and geographic centers than defense bases or organizations.

I therefore find general agreement between the U.S. intelligence captured in this dataset and U.S. Arctic policy: neither securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic in the time period studied. These findings align with observed non-securitized behavior of the U.S. government in regards to the Arctic during this time period.

A broader question drives this research: Why does the U.S. lag behind other Arctic nations in Arctic infrastructure, in Arctic industrial development, and

in Arctic military and coast guard defense capacity?[97] While this project has determined that intelligence had not securitized Russian behavior in the Arctic, and that there was no disconnect with regard to security between policy and intelligence, the project has only scratched the surface of this larger question regarding the lack of U.S. engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s.

I propose three possible options to account for the lack of engagement of the United States government in Arctic affairs:

- Option 1: Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s was not, in fact, a threat to U.S. national security.
- Option 2: U.S. intelligence failed to contextualize Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s, and therefore failed to recognize the threat it posed and continues to pose to U.S. national security.
- Option 3: Other, non-intelligence factors govern securitization of the Arctic and how it aligns with U.S. Arctic engagement. These factors include other crises, in particular terrorism and turmoil in the Middle East, which eclipsed Russian engagement in the Arctic.

As for the first two possibilities, much uncertainty persists about the degree of threat posed to the United States by Russian engagement in the Arctic. Even in a "post-Crimea" world U.S. discourse surrounding Russian engagement in the Arctic remains fragmented. Across key security agencies in the United States, consensus seems to be emerging that the United States must enhance its presence and capacities in the Arctic, although specific policies have not

[97] It should be noted that U.S. subsurface and air capacity remain quite high.

emerged. In mid-2015 key defense actors including Secretary of Defense Ash Carter,[98] USCG Admiral Paul Zukunft,[99] and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey[100] publically and officially recognized the severe gap in U.S. Arctic preparedness and policy. Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski has been very vocal[101] about needs for special Arctic provisioning for army, navy, air force, and coast guard forces to respond to potential Arctic conflicts. A growing concern about Russia and Russia in the Arctic informs this dialogue, but no clear consensus has informed policy. Senator Murkowski reported at a May 2015 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on defense spending: "I was at the Arctic Council Meeting last week with Secretary Kerry, and all anybody wanted to talk about was Russia's Arctic push and what we were going to do with that regard. . . . I think we are all trying to understand exactly what Russia is doing here."[102] Uncertainty and inaction still typify the United States' response to Russian engagement in the Arctic.

Granted, no major conflicts have taken place in the Arctic, or as a direct result of a contested Arctic issue. This gives some credence to Option 1, that

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[98] Erica Martinson, "Carter: US Arctic Defense Policy Falls Short," *Alaska Dispatch News*, May 06, 2015, accessed October 13, 2015, https://www.adn.com/article/20150506/carter-us-arctic-defense-policy-falls-short.

[99] "Coast Guard Commandant Says U.S. Falling Far Behind Russia in Arctic," *DoD Buzz,* April 14, 2015, Accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/04/14/coast-guard-commandant-says-u-s-falling-far-behind-russia-in-arctic/.

[100] "Secretary Carter and General Dempsey Testimony on Defense Department's 2016 Budget." 2015. *C-SPAN.org*. Accessed July 6.http://www.c-span.org/video/?325804-1/secretary-carter-general-dempsey-testimony-defense-departments-2016-budget.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

Russian engagement in the Arctic is not actually a threat to U.S. national security. But I believe that Option 2, that U.S. intelligence failed to contextualize Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s, which is in fact a threat to U.S. national security), is much more likely to be true.

Russian foreign policy in general, and in regard to the Arctic in particular during the early 2000s should be of concern to U.S. national security. The most troubling aspect of Russian foreign policy behavior is its demonstrated lack of regard for sovereign territory, and its use of mixed military forces to achieve these aims. Russian willingness to engage non-state actors, unidentified military forces, and cyber-attacks, and its ability to handily operate in gray areas of international law to further its goals undermines a global political structure built upon the supremacy of international law and state sovereignty. A variety of Arctic actors and observers share these views; yet the international community has not come to consensus on securitization of Russian behavior in the Arctic.

The tide is changing in this regard, and the summer and fall of 2015 saw increasing wariness of Russian aggression. The Unites States' National Military Strategy released in June 2015 documents a high degree of concern about Russia's recent behavior. According to this document, Russia "has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia's military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces."[103] A 2015 report from the

[103] "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015," Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

U.S. Center for European Policy Analysis on Baltic security (a non-federal group) takes a very doom and gloom approach to the complicated interdependencies involving NATO and non-NATO states. The think tank's report argues that Russian behavior may reveal fatal weaknesses in NATO and in U.S. military capacity, and that Russian aggression ultimately could upset global world order:

> NATO could be revealed as powerless, perhaps without even a shot being fired. America's role as the ultimate guarantor of European security would be over in a matter of hours. That would end the rules-based European order... It would herald a Hobbesian age—all too familiar in other parts of the world—in which big countries do the deals that they can, and small countries accept the outcomes that they must. Such a humbling of America in Europe would have a huge and potentially catastrophic effect on security elsewhere. Allies such as Japan, Taiwan (Republic of China) and South Korea would find it hard to believe American security guarantees. They would be strongly tempted to either make their own arrangements with the authorities in Beijing or engage in a destabilizing nuclear arms race to guarantee their own security.[104]

This is a very stark vision of future developments, but Russia's behavior in Crimea and Ukraine substantiates the report's claims that European interdependencies have prevented a successful and swift securitized response to Russia's aggression. American and Western European values, business practices, legal frameworks, and way of ordering the world are increasingly falling on deaf ears with powerful non-Western states. Failing to fully recognize that Russia, China, and some Middle Eastern states are playing by a different set of rules entirely, prohibits the United States from responding effectively or

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[104] Edward Lucas, "The Coming Storm Baltic Sea Security Report," *Center for European Policy Analysis*, June 2015, http://www.cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20%282%29.compressed.pdf, 3.

implementing a strategy to its own advantage. Willing Russia to "fall in line" is not effective policy in the Arctic, or elsewhere in the world.

As for Option 3, since Mikhail Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech, the Arctic has experienced an era of peace. Western Arctic states welcomed this new era with relief and enthusiasm. Despite 2014 and 2015 being years of concern and uncertainty over Russian Arctic intentions, optimism dominated the U.S. public stance on Russian Arctic engagement until late 2015. As late as May 2015, Director of the Arctic Program at the Pew Charitable Trusts Scott Highleyman said, "I think the Arctic genuinely is shaping up to be the exception to the rule… The United States and Russia seem to be trying really hard to keep talking to each other."[105] What has fueled U.S. persistence in striving for peace in the Arctic well into 2015?

One factor, illustrated in this project's dataset, is U.S. entanglement in other, stickier geopolitical issues. Crises in the Middle East, domestic and international implications of a global economic downturn, and a more volatile world overall strained U.S. resources during the timeframe of this research project. The second Obama administration, in the run up to the U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council, is engaging more actively in Arctic issues. That being said, the United States appears to be viewing the Arctic from a broader perspective than does Russia. This perspective includes considerations of climate change, indigenous rights, oil production, environmental stewardship,

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[105] Andrew E. Kramer, "Russia and U.S. Find Common Cause in Arctic Pact," *The New York Times*, May 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/world/russia-and-us-find-common-cause-in-arctic-pact.html.

health of Arctic communities, and other broad spectrum security issues. This broad perspective of U.S. interests in the Arctic, coupled with a low level of regional security concerns, in contrast with general alarm regarding Middle East developments, all contribute to anemic U.S. engagement in the Arctic.

Instead of examining U.S. engagement in the Arctic as a *lack* of response, perhaps it is more useful to ask what behaviors characterize U.S. response to an increasingly aggressive Russia in the Arctic. Many actors have indicated unease concerning Russia's intentions, while others express uncertainty about the true nature of Russia's military or industry capacities. Some have communicated a pragmatic desire for cooperation and peace. Remarks by Heather Connelly of the Center for Strategic and International Studies quoted in the *Washington Post* in April 2015 fall into all three of these categories. "I think we need a more robust assessment of Russia's capabilities, modernization and intent in the Arctic," she said. "And we need to send some very clear messages privately and publicly to the Kremlin that we all want the Arctic to remain a place of international cooperation."[106] Her comments demonstrate widespread uncertainty about Russia's current capacity in the Arctic and Russian intentions in the Arctic. It is uncertainty about Russian intent, uncertainty about Russian capacity, and a desire for an enduring Arctic peace and cooperation that seem to be the three main conditions shaping U.S. response to Russian engagement in the Arctic.

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[106] Michael E. Miller, "Arctic 'chill' as Russia Reverts to Cold War Air and Sea Confrontations," *The Washington Post*, April 17, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/17/arctic-chill-as-russia-reverts-to-cold-war-air-and-sea-confrontations/.

Considering the boldness of Russia's recent behavior in the Arctic, and the clarity of its Arctic strategy published in 2008, such uncertainty is puzzling. Russia seems to be quite steadily achieving its publicly stated goals of updating and expanding its military capacity in the Arctic. This includes land, air, and sea-based operations. In light of this determined pursuit of its publically expressed aims, the West's persistent vision of a peaceful and cooperative Arctic seems naïve; Russia has clearly stated that it needs to develop its Arctic region. Given Russia's bold pursuit of its interests in Crimea and Ukraine, it appears likely that Russia will similarly pursue and protect its interests in the Arctic.

This research encompassed by this thesis finds no indication that the U.S. intelligence community, the State Department or even President Obama himself has securitized Russian activity in the Arctic. I conclude that uncertainty about Russian intent, diverse domestic policy interests, and geopolitical threats elsewhere in the world have left the United States vulnerable to Russian aggression. Russian strategic dominance, U.S. incapacity to respond effectively, and international interdependencies within the Arctic pave the way for Russia to pursue its interests unhindered.

Appendix A

List of important words as identified by researcher from context and dataset text

A

activist, activists, aerial, aerospace, agreement, aircraft, airport, airspace, alarm, Alaska, allegation, allegations, allege, anti-terror, argue , argued, argues, Arkhangelsk, armed , arms , attack , attacking, attacks , autocracy, award, awarded, awarding, awards

B

backfire, Beaufort, behavior, belong, Bering, bluster, bomb , boost, border , boring, BP, bribe, bribery, bribes, business, Canada, Canadian, carrier, Chilingarov, Chupriyan, CIA , Cold War,

C

combatant, combatants, comment, complicated, concern, concerned, concerns, confidence, confidence-building, conflict, congress, Congress, consequences, construction, constructive, corrupt, corrupted, corruption, counter, court, creep, crime, criminal, crisis, critcism, critic, critical, criticize, cutoff

D

danger, Danish, dead, death, defeat, defeated, defeating, defensive, defensiveness, delimit, delimiting, Denmark, desertion, desire, desired, destroy, destroy, destroyed, destroyer, destroying, destruction, DHS, die, dirty, disarmament, disdain, disease, dismiss, dismissal, disrupt, disrupted, disruption, disturb, disturbing, DoD, DOD, Duma, dying

E

EEZ, election, emergencies, emergency, emergent, emerging, Enel, enemies, enemy, energy, Eni, enrich, enriched, environment, ESA, evidence, evil, exacerbate, exacerbating, exaggerate, exaggerated, exaggerating, excitement, explicit, exploit, exploitation, exploited, exploiting, export, extreme, extremely, extremist, Exxon, ExxonMobil,

F

fear, fearful, fears, fight, fighting, firm, fish, fisheries, fishing, fraud, freeze, freezing, freight, fringe, fringes, FSB

G

gas, Gazprom, Gorshkov, GPS, Greenland, Greenlandic, grievance, grievances

H

hamper, hard, hate, hazard, hazardous, hazing, health, high north, humiliate, humiliation, humiliations, hydrocarbon, hydrocarbons

I

ice-class, Iceland, Icelandic, illegal, impact, import, importation, imprisonment, in-fighting, incarcerated, incarceration, incident, incidents, indigenous, industry, intelligence, ire

K
kickback, kickbacks, kiss of death, Kola, Kremlin,

L
launch, Lavrov, law, leadership, legal, limit, limiting, listen, LNG, love, Lukoil

M
mafia, Magadan, map, mapping, maps, march, marine, maritime, market, markets, Matviyenko, McFaul, Medvedev, mess, mine, mineral, mining, morale, Moscow, movement, Murmansk, muscle, muscular

N
native, NATO, Navy, negative, negatives, Nenets, north, northern, Northern Sea Route, Norway, Norwegian, Novatek, NSR, nuclear

O
ocean, oceans, offshore, oil, onshore, oppose, opposition, order, ordered, orders, overtures

P
party, Party, patrol, Patrushev, peace, peaceful, Pechora, perceive, perceived, phobia, phobias, pipeline, piracy, pirate, pirated, polar, polarizing, pole, police, political, politician, politics, port, portrayal, portrayals, positive, positives, possibility, posture, power, power, powerful, pride, prided, Prirazlomnoye, prison, prisoner, prisoners, prisons, problem, problems, progress, prominent, protection, protest, proud, provocation, provocation, provocations, provoke, provoked, Putin

R
radiation, radioactive, raid, rally, reactor, reactors, rebuff, rebuffed, reject, rejected, rejecting, rejection, remarks, repression, research, resource, resources, rhetoric, rights, risk, robust, rocky, Rogozin, Roscosmos, Rosneft, rough, rude, rudeness, rumor, rumors, Russneft

S
sad, safe, safety, Sakhalin, science, scientific, sea, seabed, seas, seawater, Sechin, security, sensitive, sensitivities, serious, SeverEnergiya, Severodvinsk, Sevmash, shame, shelf, Shell, ship, shipyard, Shtokman, significant, silence, sincere, sincerity, skeptical, snipe, soft, Soviet, St. Petersburg, stance, StatoilHydro, stupid, stupidity, submarine, submarines, submerged, surprise, surprising, Sweden, Swedish

T
tension, tensions, Termeftegaz, terror, terrorist, threat, TNK-BP, tough, trafficked, trafficking, transport, tribal, twist

U
UN, underwater, unhelpful, unmanned, unwilling, unwillingness, uranium, USAID, USCG,

V
Varandey, Vasiliev, vessel, vessels, victim, victims, violations, Vladivostock, vote, votes, vulnerabilities, vulnerable, Vysotsky

W
war, warhead, warhead, warheads, waring, water, weak, weapon, weapons, willing, willingness, wish, wishful, wishfully

Y
Yakutia, Yamal

Z
Zvyozdochka

Appendix B

Type of Sweep	Sources (February 2010)	Sources (April 2011)
Quick Sweep	RIA (Russia) Itar-Tass Kyiv Post Radio Free Europe Gazeta.Kz Trend news Kazakhstan Today	n/a
Intermediary AOR Sweep	Gazeta Pravda ForUm Belta Baltic Course Ferghana news Pan Armenian Civil.Ge	n/a
FULL FSU SWEEP: Russia	RIA Novosti ITAR TASS Gazeta Pravda Russia Today RBC News Regnum News Moscow Times Barents Observer	BBC "Week Ahead" calendar for Former Soviet Union Interfax.ru ITAR TASS Prime TASS Kommersant RIA Novosti RBC News Moscow Times Regnum News Ferghana
FULL FSU SWEEP: Ukraine	Kyiv Post Interfax Ukraine UN Unian ForUm NRCU	http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148 http://www.ukraine-observer.com/ - monthly http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/ http://www.moreover.com/cgi-local/page?page?o=portal&feed=374 http://www.unian.net/eng/online/12/ http://www.kyivpost.com/ http://www.ukrainianjournal.com/index.php http://otherside.com.ua/news/rubrics.php?lang=3&rubric_id=1 http://en.for-ua.com/ http://www.interfax.kiev.ua/eng/ - for subscribers http://www.ukrinform.com/eng/search/?r[]=1 – for subscribers http://mignews.com.ua/en/archive/2007/04/04/

FULL FSU SWEEP: Belarus	Belta Charter'97	www.belta.by http://www.belapan.com/en http://www.belarustoday.info/?sid=87 – not much updated
Full FSU Sweep: Moldova	Moldova Azi Moldpres	http://politicom.moldova.org/index/eng/ http://www.azi.md/en.html http://www.basa.md/ http://www.interlic.md/index.php?lang=eng http://www.reporter.md/en/
Full FSU Sweep: Baltics	Baltic Course Baltic Times balticbusinessnews Baltic Reports	n/a
Full FSU Sweep: General Central Asia/Caucasus	Radio Free Europe Ferghana news Eurasianet	n/a

Full FSU Sweep: Kazakhstan	Gazeta.Kz Interfax Kazakhstan KT	http://eng.gazeta.kz/ http://www.inform.kz/index.php?lang=eng http://www.kz-today.kz/index.php?lang=eng&act=by_sec http://www.kazpravda.kz/index.php?lang=eng http://www.interfax.kz/?lang=eng&int_id=14&function=view&news_id=11799
Full FSU Sweep: Uzbekistan	UzReport UzA	http://www.rferl.org/featuresarchive/country/uzbekistan.html http://jahon.mfa.uz/index.php?newlang=eng http://www.uza.uz/en/
Full FSU Sweep: Tajikistan	n/a	http://tajikistan.neweurasia.net/ http://www.avesta.tj/en/ http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/
Full FSU Sweep: Kyrgyzstan	n/a	http://eng.24.kg/ http://en.kabar.kg/ http://www.akipress.com/_en_arc.php?catid=|ief| http://www.akipress.com/_en_arc.php?catid=|erf| http://www.ktr.kg/news/en/ - not updated
Full FSU Sweep: Turkmenistan	Turkmenistan.ru	http://www.rferl.org/featuresarchive/country/turkmenistan.html http://www.turkmenistan.ru/?lang_id=en&&sort=date_desc
Full FSU	Trend news	http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/en/index.pl

Sweep: Azerbaijan	APA News. Az AzerNEWS	http://analitika.az/browse.php?sec_id=8 – weekly, MON http://en.apa.az/last.php?show=3 http://www.azerbaijan.az/_News/_news_e.html?lang=en http://www.today.az/view_latest_news.php http://www.azertag.com/index_en.html
Full FSU Sweep: Armenia	Pan Armenian News.am Panorama Aysor	http://www.arka.am/ http://mediaforum.am/armtoday.php?LangID=1 http://www.defacto.am/index.php?OP=71303168 http://www.arminfo.info/ http://www.armenpress.am/eng/news/news.htm http://new.aravot.am/en/ http://new.aravot.am/en/articles/politics http://www.yerkir.am/eng/?sub=last_news http://www.panorama.am/en/ http://www.panarmenian.net/ www.armenianow.com – weekly, FRI http://www.a1plus.am/en/?page=LatestNews – TV http://www.armradio.am/ - RADIO
Full FSU Sweep: Georgia	Civil.Ge Rustavi 2 Georgian Times	http://www.radio-imedi.ge/eng/ http://www.imedinews.ge/en/georgia http://eng.primenewsonline.com/ http://www.geotimes.ge/?lang=eng http://www.messenger.com.ge/ http://www.accessnorthga.com/ http://www.rustavi2.com.ge/index.php http://www.georgiatoday.ge/articles.php?cat=Politics&version=349

Appendix C



Top 20 Tags	Significance	freq
PREL	Political Affairs - External Political Relations	125
RS and RU	Russia	73
PGOV	Political Affairs - Government; Internal Governmental Affairs	70
SENV	Social Affairs - Environment	46
NO	Norway	45
ENRG	Economic Affairs - Energy and Power	40
ECON	Economic Affairs - Economic Conditions Trends and Potential	38
MARR	Military and Defense Affairs - Military and Defense Arrangements	33
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	31

EPET	Economic Affairs - Petroleum and Natural Gas	24
MOPS	Military and Defense Affairs - Military Operations	23
AF	Afghanistan	19
PINR	Political Affairs - Intelligence	18
ETRD	Economic Affairs - Foreign Trade	17
KGHG	Global Climate Change	15
PHUM	Political Affairs - Human Rights	15
PARM	Political Affairs - Arms Controls and Disarmament	12
DA	Denmark	11
FI	Finland	11

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